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Dividing Crime, Multiplying
Punishments
John F. Stinneford*
When the government wants to impose exceptionally harsh punishment
on a criminal defendant, one of the ways it accomplishes this goal is to
divide the defendant's single course of conduct into multiple offenses that
give rise to multiple punishments. The Supreme Court has rendered the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and
the rule of lenity incapable of handling this problem by emptying them of
substantive content and transforming them into mere instruments for
effectuation of legislative will.
This Article demonstrates that all three doctrines originally reflected a
substantive legal preference for life and liberty, and a systemic bias against
overpunishment. A punishment was deemed excessive under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause if it was greater than an offender's retributive
desert, as measured against longstanding punishment practice. Prior to the
twentieth century, if prosecutors proposed a novel unit of prosecution for a
given crime, judges asked two questions: (1) Does this unit of prosecution
give the government the opportunity to bring multiple charges based on a
single course of conduct?; and (2) If so, would the bringing of multiple
charges create an arbitrary relationship between the offender's culpability
and his cumulative punishment, measured in light of prior punishment
practice? If the answer to both questions was yes, judges would declare the
punishment invalid under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the
Double Jeopardy Clause, or the rule of strict construction of penal statutes
(the forerunner to today's rule of lenity). By recovering this methodology
for addressing prosecutorial efforts to divide crime and multiply
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punishments, we can ameliorate our current mass incarceration crisis and
make the American criminal justice system more just.
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This notion of rendering crimes ... infinitely divisible, is
repugnant to the spirit and policy of the law and ought not to
be countenanced.'
INTRODUCTION
In criminal cases, the power to divide the unit of prosecution often
entails the power to impose excessive punishment. When the federal
government wanted to suppress Mormon polygamy, prosecutors
developed a practice of indicting, convicting, and punishing a given
defendant multiple times for a single cohabitation. They accomplished
this by dividing a single cohabitation period into distinct time units
and bringing a separate charge relating to each time unit.2 Similarly,
when state government wanted to control the liquor industry, it
charged unlicensed retailers conducting business in the jurisdiction
with a separate violation for each individual sale, obtaining a life
sentence for multiple misdemeanor convictions.3 Today, when
prosecutors want to force a guilty plea from a drug dealer who
possesses a gun during the time period in which he deals drugs, they
use 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to charge him with a separate illegal gun
possession for each drug transaction. 4 Because § 924(c) calls for a
mandatory consecutive sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment for
each count of conviction beyond the first, they can threaten even
small-time drug dealers with multiple life sentences. 5
Current doctrines of constitutional and statutory interpretation are
ill-equipped to handle this problem. Although the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit
excessive punishments, it has also held that legislatures are free to
define the meaning of the term "excessive" for themselves, and that
claims of excessive punishment should be resolved through the
I State v. Comm'rs of Fayetteville, 2 N.C. (1 Mur.) 371, 371-72 (1818).
2 See, e.g., Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 176 (1889); Ex parte Snow, 120 U.S.
274, 276-77 (1887).
3 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 326-37 (1892).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32, 1263 (D.
Utah 2004) (Cassell, J.) (sentencing defendant to mandatory minimum sentence of
fifty-five years in prison for possessing a firearm during several marijuana sales
arranged by the government). The case is discussed more extensively below. See
discussion infra Part I.A.
5 See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131, 137 (1993) (holding that the
mandatory escalation of a defendant's sentence to twenty-five years per count for a
"second or subsequent offense" under § 924(c) applied to cases where prosecutors
brought multiple charges in a single case against a defendant who had never before
been convicted of violating the statute).
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political process rather than constitutional adjudication.6 Although the
Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit multiple
punishments for the same offense, it has also held that the Clause does
not restrict the freedom of legislatures to authorize multiple
punishments if they wish. 7 Finally, although the Court recognizes the
rule of lenity, which holds that ambiguous criminal statutory
provisions should be narrowly construed, it utilizes this rule rarely,
inconsistently, and only as a doctrine of last resort.8 Where even the
slightest evidence indicates a legislative preference for a broad
construction of a criminal statute, the Supreme Court leaves the rule
of lenity by the wayside. 9 In sum, far from constraining the
government, all three doctrines are interpreted as ways of effectuating
legislative will. There is little to prevent prosecutors from dividing
crimes and obtaining multiple punishments unless the statute upon
which the prosecution is based clearly forbids it.
This Article demonstrates that prior to the twentieth century, judges
used the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and the rule of strict construction of penal statutes to prevent
the government from dividing the unit of prosecution in order to
impose excessive punishments. 1° A punishment was deemed excessive
if it was greater than an offender deserved as a matter of retributive
6 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27-28 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating
that the question of whether a punishment is excessive in relation to its justification is
"appropriately directed at the legislature," not the Court); see also, e.g., Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003-04 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (using the "rational basis" test to uphold mandatory life
sentence for narcotics offender with no prior record). The Supreme Court takes a
more protective approach to a small class of excessive punishment cases involving the
death penalty or juvenile offenders subjected to life sentences with no possibility of
parole. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding it
unconstitutional to impose mandatory sentences of life without possibility of parole
on juvenile offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding it
unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on an offender who commits a non-
homicide offense against an individual). The Court's current approach to excessive
punishments is discussed more fully infra Part I.B.
7 See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 793 (1985); Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.8 (1977).
8 See infra Part I.C (discussing the rule of lenity); see, e.g., Deal, 508 U.S. at 135-
37 (refusing to use the rule of lenity to limit the scope of Section 924(c) repeat offense
provisions); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239-41 (1993) (refusing to use the
rule of lenity to restrict § 924(c)'s prohibition of the "use" of a gun to further a
narcotics trafficking crime to those who use a gun as a weapon rather than as barter).
9 See Deal, 508 U.S. at 135; see also Smith, 508 U.S. at 239.
10 See infra Part II.B.
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justice.1 Common law thinkers considered "long usage" to be the
most reliable measure of a legal practice's reasonableness 12 and,
therefore, they measured excessiveness in relation to longstanding
prior practice. 13 A new punishment practice that was significantly
harsher than the punishments previously given for the same or similar
crimes was considered excessive. 14
When prosecutors proposed a novel unit of prosecution for a given
crime, judges protected against the risk of excessive punishment by
asking two questions: (1) Does this unit of prosecution give the
government the opportunity to bring multiple charges based on a
single course of conduct?; and (2) If so, would the bringing of
multiple charges create an arbitrary relationship between the
offender's culpability and his cumulative punishment?15 These
questions were posed against the backdrop of longstanding prior
punishment practice. A cumulative punishment's relationship to an
offender's culpability could be deemed arbitrary if it departed too
significantly from the punishment practices that had prevailed up to
that point. 16
Judges employed this analysis regardless of whether a punishment
was being challenged under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, or the rule of strict construction
of penal statutes (the forerunner to today's rule of lenity). If
prosecutors actually stacked up an unreasonably harsh cumulative
punishment for a given course of conduct, this was deemed cruel and
unusual. 17 If the proposed unit of prosecution divided up a course of
conduct so as to create a significant risk of excessive punishment,
judges sometimes deemed this practice to violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 18 Finally, judges used this analysis most frequently when
11 See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 916-17 (2011) [hereinafter Rethinking
Proportionality].
12 See id. at 935; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV 1739, 1774-75 (2008)
[hereinafter The Original Meaning of "Unusual"].
13 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 935; Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of "Unusual," supra note 12, at 1783-84.
14 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 935; Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of "Unusual," supra note 12, at 1791-92.
15 See infra Part I1.B.
16 See infra Part I1.B.
17 See infra Part II.B.1.
18 See infra Part II.B.2.
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deciding how to construe criminal statutes. 19 The rule of strict
construction of penal statutes directed judges to presume, in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, that the legislature did not
intend to authorize an unduly harsh punishment.20 Therefore, where
possible, judges interpreted criminal statutes not to authorize a unit of
prosecution that would permit numerous charges based on a single
course of conduct, particularly where the cumulative punishment
resulting from such charges would be arbitrarily harsh in relation to
the offender's culpability. 21
Part I discusses the Supreme Court's current approach to division
and excess as reflected in its cruel and unusual punishments, double
jeopardy, and rule of lenity jurisprudence. This Part uses a single case
- the prosecution of Weldon Angelos for multiple violations of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) - as a lens for viewing the current emptiness of all
three doctrines.22 Part II contrasts the Court's current approach to
division and excess to English and American jurisprudence of the
seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. Part II.A demonstrates
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and the rule of strict construction of penal statutes were
originally directed, in large part, toward the prevention of excessive
punishments. Unlike today, these areas of doctrine were not treated as
value-free tools for the effectuation of legislative will. Part II.B shows
how eighteenth and nineteenth century judges used all three areas of
doctrine - but especially the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes - to negate prosecutorial efforts to divide crime and obtain
multiple punishments. Part III provides a tentative sketch of how the
protective moral realism of the seventeenth through nineteenth
centuries transformed into the empty positivism of the late twentieth
19 See infra Part ll.B.3.
20 See infra Part 1l.B.3.
21 See infra Part lH.B.3.
22 The sentencing of Weldon Angelos gave rise to an extraordinary opinion by
then-Federal District Judge Paul Cassell. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d
1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2004). This opinion, which is discussed more fully below, does
an excellent job illustrating the arbitrariness and excess permitted by § 924(c), as well
as the inadequacy of current Eighth Amendment doctrine to deal with this problem.
See infra Part I.A. The opinion led to further scholarship by Judge Cassell and many
others discussing the need to reform mandatory minimum sentences. See generally
Paul G. Cassell & Erik Luna, Sense and Sensibility in Mandatory Minimum Sentencing,
23 FED. SENT'G REP. 219 (2011) (advocating reform of mandatory minimum
sentencing laws); Erik Luna &, Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1 (2010) (proposing "political minimalism" as a justification that may make
legislative sentencing reform feasible).
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and early twenty-first centuries. This Part also discusses how to
recover the courts' prior focus on the prevention of excessive
punishments and to rein in the increasingly prevalent practice of
division and stacking. Like Part I, Part III focuses on the case of
Weldon Angelos.
I. THREE EMPTY DOCTRINES
Title 18 United States Code § 924(c), as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, just may be the most oppressive criminal statute in the federal
code. This statute makes possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense a federal crime, and provides escalating
punishment for each conviction. The first § 924(c) conviction calls for
a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment to be
served consecutively to any other sentence. 23 Each additional
conviction calls for a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five
years, once again consecutive to any other sentence. 24 The Supreme
Court has interpreted § 924(c) to require escalating punishments even
when multiple charges are brought in a single case.25 Thus,
prosecutors can often impose extraordinarily long sentences on street-
level drug dealers simply by manipulating the number of controlled
buys performed by an informant or undercover agent prior to the
offender's arrest. As discussed below, such prosecutions arguably
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause's prohibition of
excessive punishments, the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition of
multiple punishments for the same offense, and the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes (now generally called the rule of lenity).
Because these doctrines are currently empty of substance, however, a
defendant is highly unlikely to win a claim under any of them.
Witness the case of Weldon Angelos:
A. The Angelos Case
In May and June of 2002, a government informant made three
controlled buys of marijuana from Weldon Angelos, a twenty-four year
old aspiring musician and father of two with no criminal record. 26 In
each buy, the informant paid Angelos $350 for eight ounces of
23 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
24 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).
25 See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1993).
26 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
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marijuana. 27 During the first two buys, Angelos had a Glock pistol in
his car or on his person, but he did not hold or brandish the firearm. 28
In November 2003, police obtained an arrest warrant and arrested
Angelos in his apartment. 29 With Angelos's consent, they searched his
apartment and discovered three pounds of marijuana, two opiate
suckers, and three firearms - two of which were locked inside a safe.30
Angelos was charged with three counts of distributing marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, one count of possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c), and two other minor offenses.3' Because the quantity of
marijuana was relatively small, 21 U.S.C. § 841 did not require any
mandatory minimum sentence for the marijuana distribution. 32 The
United States Sentencing Guidelines called for a sentence of seventy-
eight to ninety-seven months, or six and a half to eight years, for this
crime. 33 The gun possession statute under which Angelos was also
charged, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), required a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years for the first conviction 34 and a mandatory minimum
sentence of twenty-five years for a "second or subsequent
conviction." 35 No term of imprisonment under § 924(c) may run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, therefore the five-
plus year sentence would, upon Angelos's conviction, be tacked onto
the end of his narcotics distribution sentence.36
Prosecutors informed Angelos that if he pled guilty to the marijuana
distribution and gun possession counts they would drop the lesser
charges, and recommend a total sentence of fifteen years
imprisonment. 37 They also threatened that if he chose to go to trial,
they would file a superseding indictment containing several additional
§ 924(c) counts, subjecting him to a mandatory minimum sentence of
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 In order to qualify for a mandatory minimum sentence for marijuana possession
or trafficking, a person must possess at least 100 kilograms of "a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of marihuana." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii)-(D)
(2012). Angelos was found to have possessed a little over 1.25 kilograms (three
pounds) of marijuana. See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
33 See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d. at 1232.
34 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
35 Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).
36 See id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
37 See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
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more than one hundred years imprisonment.38 When Angelos elected
to go to trial, prosecutors followed through on this threat.39 Angelos
tried to reopen plea negotiations and even offered to accept a harsher
deal than the government initially offered, but the prosecutors
refused.40 At trial, Angelos was convicted of the marijuana distribution
charges and three of five counts brought under § 924(c). 41 Judge Paul
Cassell sentenced Angelos to imprisonment for fifty-five years and one
day, which was the minimum sentence permissible under the law.42
Traditionally, an offender like Angelos could have raised at least
three arguments that his punishment was illegal. First, he could have
argued that his fifty-five year sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments because
it was an excessive punishment for gun possession.43 Second, he could
have argued that allowing the government to obtain multiple
punishments for a single continuing gun possession violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.4 4 Finally, he could have argued that the rule
of strict construction of penal statutes (now generally called the rule of
38 Id. Professor Sara Sun Beale has suggested that the extremely harsh sentences
available under Section 924(c) have led federal prosecutors to "mak[e] § 924(c) the
most frequently prosecuted federal firearms offense" and have given them incentive to
"aggressively seek[] to broaden its reach through expansive interpretations of its
terms." Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J.
1641, 1675 (2002). The most important effect of these sentences may be the "terrific
leverage in plea bargaining" they give prosecutors, as exemplified by the Angelos case.
See id. at 1677.
39 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1230.
43 See infra Parts II.A.2, lI.B.1.
44 See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.2. Although the Supreme Court held in Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
multiple punishments for the same offense even where all of the punishments are
imposed in a single case, there is controversy as to whether this is a correct reading of
the Clause. Compare GEORGE C. THOMAS Il, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW
109-10 (1998) (arguing that Ex parte Lange was a correct interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause), with Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy's Demise, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1001, 1008 n.22 (2000) (reviewing Thomas I1, supra, at 109) (arguing that Ex parte
Lange's prohibition of multiple punishments in a single case was based upon statutory
construction, and that its true constitutional basis was the Due Process Clause).
Resolution of this controversy is beyond the scope of the present Article. The article
proceeds on the assumption that Ex parte Lange was a correct double jeopardy
decision. If this assumption turns out to be incorrect, Angelos's arguments under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes would not be undermined in any way. See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
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lenity) required the court to interpret § 924(c) to prevent the dividing
and stacking of gun possession counts in a single case.45 Because all
three doctrines were traditionally directed against excessive
punishments,46 Angelos might once have been able to obtain relief
from his sentence under any one of them. As is shown below, such
hopes are unrealistic today because the Supreme Court has emptied all
three doctrines of substance.47
B. Excessive Punishments Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause
At sentencing, Angelos argued that his punishment violated the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because it was excessive in
relation to his offense. 48 In order to determine whether a punishment
is excessive in relation to a given offense, a court needs two things: (1)
a definition of "excessive;" 49 and (2) a method of measuring whether
the punishment meets the definition. 50 The current Supreme Court
has failed on both fronts. 51
Several possible definitions of the term "excessive" are available.
The Court might hold that that a punishment is excessive if it is more
than the offender deserves as a matter of retributive justice. 52
Alternatively, the Court might hold that it is excessive if it is more
than necessary to obtain a utilitarian goal such as optimal deterrence,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation. 53 The choice of definition affects
which punishments will be considered excessive and which will not. A
punishment that is clearly excessive as a retributive matter, for
example, may sometimes satisfy a utilitarian rationale such as
incapacitation or deterrence. 54
45 See infra Parts II.A.4, II.B.3.
46 See infra Part II.A.
47 See infra Part 1.B-C.
48 See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.
49 See, e.g., NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828), available at http://webstersdictionary1828.com/ (defining the term "excessive"
as "[b]eyond the established laws of morality and religion, or beyond the bounds of
justice, fitness, propriety, expedience or utility; as excessive indulgence of any kind").
50 For a rich discussion of punishment, proportionality, and retributive schemes,
see Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 588-97 (2005).
51 See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
52 See Frase, supra note 50, at 590-92.
53 See id.
54 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 916-17.
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Because the prohibition of excessive punishments comes from the
Constitution itself, the Supreme Court is obligated to choose the
definition of "excessive" that comports with constitutional meaning.
Phrased differently, the Court must determine what sort of
justification makes punishment permissible under the Constitution, so
that it can determine whether a given punishment is excessive in
relation to that justification. As discussed below, the traditional
justification for punishment under the Constitution has been
retribution: An offender can only be punished if he deserves it, and
only to the extent that he deserves it.55 A punishment is excessive
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause if it is harsher than
the offender deserves.56
Unfortunately for Angelos, the Supreme Court no longer follows the
traditional definition of excessive.57 In fact, it no longer defines
"excessive" at all. 58 Rather, it has held that legislatures are free to
choose their own justification for punishment, whether it be
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, or a mere
regulatory purpose.59 The Court has also held that the relationship
between the punishment and the legislature's chosen justification is a
matter of legislative prerogative. So long as there is some conceivable
rational relationship between the punishment and its justification,
courts must uphold it.6O The only recourse for those who believe the
punishment is excessive is through the political process. 61
Because the Supreme Court's definition of "excessive" is empty, it
now uses presumptions rather than analysis to decide excessiveness
cases under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 62 In a small
class of cases involving life sentences for juvenile offenders or the
55 See id. at 962-68.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010); Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion).
58 See cases cited supra note 57.
'9 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (examining whether a sentence of life without
parole furthers goals of "retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation");
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 ("Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice
to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.").
60 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-30; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000, 1004
(1991) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
61 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (holding that the question of whether a sentence of
twenty-five years to life for shoplifting by a recidivist was excessive was "appropriately
directed at the legislature," not the Court).
62 See John F. Stinneford, The Illusory Eighth Amendment, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 437,
482-83 (2013) [hereinafter Illusory Eighth Amendment].
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death penalty, the Court uses a strong presumption of
unconstitutionality to invalidate punishments for an entire class of
offense or offender.63 In cases involving imprisonment of adult
offenders, on the other hand, the Court uses a strong presumption of
constitutionality. 64 It is virtually impossible for an offender like
Angelos to win a claim of excessive punishment under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.
The formal test for determining whether an adult offender's prison
term is cruelly excessive has three prongs. First, the court makes a
threshold inquiry about the gravity of the offense and the severity of
the punishment.65 If the court determines that the offense is relatively
serious, this ends the inquiry and the court upholds the punishment. 66
If the court determines that the crime does not seem serious enough to
warrant a major punishment, it moves on to prongs two and three. 67
Under prong two, the court asks whether the punishment is harsher
than punishments for similar or more serious crimes within the same
jurisdiction.68  Under prong three, the court asks whether the
punishment is harsher than punishments for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.69 Because of the strong presumption of constitutionality,
the court virtually never gets beyond prong one.
Starting with prong one, Judge Cassell noted that Angelos had no
criminal history70 and that his gun-related criminal conduct was
"modest."71 The guidelines promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission recommended a mere two-year enhancement
63 Id. at 484-89; see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding
it unconstitutional to impose life sentence with no possibility of parole on those who
commit crimes as minors); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008) (holding
it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for commission of a non-homicide
offense against an individual). Unfortunately, this class of cases only covers one-one
thousandth of one percent of felony offenders. See Stinneford, Rethinking
Proportionality, supra note 11, at 902-03.
64 See Stinneford, Illusory Eighth Amendment, supra note 62, at 482-84.
65 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (evaluating the
continuing vitality of Solem's three prongs, and applying the first gravity of the harm
versus severity of punishment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
66 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that prongs
two and three of the analysis are appropriate "only in the rare case in which a
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality").
67 See id.
68 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
69 Id. at 291-92.
70 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1257-58 (D. Utah 2004).
71 Id. at 1258.
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to Angelos' drug sentence based on his possession of a firearm,72 a
recommendation that was, according to Judge Cassell, "entitled to
special weight" because the Commission "is a congressionally-
established expert agency which can draw on significant data and
other resources in determining appropriate sentences."73 Judge Cassell
concluded that "[ci omparing a recommended sentence of two years to
the 55-year enhancement the court must impose strongly suggests not
merely disproportionality, but gross disproportionality.' 74
Judge Cassell then moved on to prong two and compared Angelos'
punishment to the punishment for other crimes in the federal system.
The judge noted that:
Mr. Angelos will receive a far longer sentence than those
imposed in the federal system for such major crimes as aircraft
hijacking, second-degree murder, racial beating inflicting life-
threatening injuries, kidnapping, and rape. Indeed, Mr.
Angelos will receive a far longer sentence than those imposed
for three aircraft hijackings, three second-degree murders,
three racial beatings inflicting life-threatening injuries, three
kidnappings, and three rapes. 75
Because Angelos' punishment was harsher than the federal system
gives for "far more serious crimes,"76 Judge Cassell noted that prong
two appeared to be satisfied. 77
Judge Cassell then went to prong three, comparing Angelos'
punishment to that given for the same offense in other jurisdictions. 78
The judge determined that Angelos' sentence was "longer than he
would receive in any of the fifty states" for the same crime, a fact that
the government itself conceded. 79
Judge Cassell then noted, however, that "[t]he court is keenly aware
of its obligation to follow precedent from superior courts," particularly
the Supreme Court.80 The judge observed that in Hutto v. Davis, 81 the
Supreme Court upheld two consecutive twenty-year sentences for a
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983)).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1259.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
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defendant who was convicted of possessing nine ounces of
marijuana. 82 If Davis' sentence was not cruel and unusual under the
governing case law, Judge Cassell could not rule that Angelos'
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. 83 Although the judge
believed Angelos' statutorily mandated sentence to be "unjust, cruel,
and irrational," 84 he felt bound to uphold the constitutionality of the
statute and to impose the fifty-five year sentence it required.
Although Judge Cassell's discussion of precedent occurred after his
discussion of the three-prong excessiveness test, the precedent
discussion was actually a commentary on prong one of this test. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it does not violate the
Constitution to impose extraordinarily harsh sentences for minor
offenses and for first-time offenders. It not only affirmed Davis's forty
year sentence for marijuana possession,85 but also sentences of twenty-
five-plus 86 and fifty-plus years 87 for recidivists who shoplifted; a life
sentence with possibility of parole for a recidivist who obtained
$120.75 by false pretenses;88 and a life sentence with no possibility of
parole for a first-time offender convicted of possessing 650 grams of
cocaine. 89 In assessing whether a comparison of the crime's gravity to
the harshness of the punishment creates an inference of gross
disproportionality, lower courts are required to follow these
precedents. 90 Courts are also required, as discussed above, to allow
legislatures to define for themselves what "excessiveness" means and
to determine for themselves whether the punishment meets that
standard. 91 Given these precedents, and given the emptiness of the
Supreme Court's excessiveness jurisprudence, there is nothing left for
lower courts to do but protest the injustice of the sentences they are
82 Id. at 372; Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
83 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
84 Id. at 1263.
85 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 372.
86 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
87 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
88 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
89 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
90 The Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm held that a sentence of life imprisonment
for an adult offender was excessive under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983). As the numerous cases cited above
indicate, this decision is treated by the Supreme Court as having almost no
precedential value.
91 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23, 25; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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required to impose,92 and to make futile pleas for the President to
commute the sentence and for Congress to reform the statute.93
C. Double Jeopardy/Rule of Lenity
An offender like Angelos might also argue that the multiple
punishments he received under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.94 The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "No person shall be ... subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 95 This
prohibition applies not only to successive trials for the same offense,
but also to multiple punishments for the same offense, even where
those punishments are imposed as part of a single proceeding.96
Angelos could argue that he committed only one § 924(c) violation,
not three, and that therefore he could lawfully be punished only once.
1. Double Jeopardy and Statutory Construction
Under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, any "multiple
punishments" argument under the Double Jeopardy Clause is largely
an argument about statutory construction. According to the Supreme
Court, the main point of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent
governmental harassment of criminal defendants through the
"embarrassment, expense and ordeal" of successive trials.97 The Clause
also has a secondary purpose of reducing the risk of excessive
punishment that arises when the government seeks a new trial after an
acquittal 98 or seeks multiple punishments for the same offense. 99
92 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1263 (D. Utah 2004)
(calling Angelos's sentence "unjust, cruel, and irrational").
93 Id. at 1261-63 (calling on Congress to amend § 924(c) and the President to
commute Angelos' sentence).
94 Angelos does not appear to have raised a double jeopardy argument at
sentencing.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969) (holding that
the Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense"), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-73 (1873) (holding that imposition of both a
fine and a prison sentence for a single offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
where the statute defining the offense listed these as alternative punishments).
97 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
98 See id. (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the risk of
punishing the innocent).
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Multiple punishments for the same offense are "numerically excessive"
in that the offender is given a greater number of punishments than is
lawful. Not all numerically excessive punishments are actually
excessive under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, although
numerical excessiveness tends toward actual excessiveness. For
example, if an offender is punished twice for the same burglary offense
under a statute calling for a maximum sentence of ten years
imprisonment and is given two four-year sentences as a result, the
punishment is probably not actually excessive under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. Where an offender is punished multiple
times under a statute that, like § 924(c), requires long and consecutive
mandatory minimum sentences for each violation, numerical excess
leads quickly to actual excess. 100
As noted in Part IB, above, the Supreme Court has held that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause permits legislatures to define
for themselves what "excessive" means and to determine for
themselves whether a given punishment meets that standard.
Similarly, it has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits
legislatures to create multiple offenses covering the same course of
conduct' 01 and to authorize multiple punishments for the same
offense. 10 2 Thus, under the Supreme Court's current double jeopardy
99 See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecutors from seeking multiple punishments for the
same offense).
100 See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences:
Reflections on the Neal Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 357 (1970) (arguing that the
availability of consecutive sentencing poses a greater threat of excessive punishments
than the availability of multiple convictions for the same course of conduct); Nancy J.
King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 104 (1995) (arguing that the availability of multiple
punishments for the same offense creates a risk of excessive punishment, so that
"constitutional limits on the amount of punishment that can be inflicted for a
particular wrong, traditionally a part of Eighth Amendment and due process law, are
inseparable from the constitutional limitations on the frequency with which an
offender can be punished for that wrong, typically rooted in double jeopardy doctrine.
The two forms of regulation operate in tandem to regulate the totality of
punishment").
101 See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple convictions and punishments for a single
course of conduct where such convictions and punishments are authorized by the
legislature).
102 See id. at 366 ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial,
the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."); Brown, 432 U.S. at
169 n.8.
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jurisprudence, Angelos could only show that he had been subjected to
double jeopardy if he could show that his prosecution was based on an
incorrect reading of § 924(c).
Angelos was convicted of three violations of a provision of § 924(c)
that punishes anyone who "possesses a firearm" "in furtherance of" a
"drug trafficking crime." 10 3 Section 924(c) is a hybrid statute,
punishing neither gun possession alone nor drug trafficking alone, but
only the two in relation to each other. The hybrid nature of the statute
is further enhanced by the fact that it defines "drug trafficking crime"
to include essentially the entire range of federal narcotics offenses,
some of which overlap with each other.1°4
Whether Angelos was subjected to multiple punishments for the
same offense depends on the appropriate unit of prosecution for a §
924(c) violation. The district court treated each individual drug
transaction as the unit of prosecution for Angelos' § 924(c) offense,
but this result is not clearly commanded by the text of the statute. 0 5 It
is at least arguable that the firearms possession, not the individual
drug transaction, should provide the unit of prosecution. The primary
focus of § 924(c) appears to be improper firearms-related conduct, not
drug trafficking, which is punished under other statutory
provisions. 106
Angelos might argue that he engaged in a single, continuous gun
possession and that prosecutors violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
by dividing this possession into separate § 924(c) counts and
obtaining multiple punishments. 107 Federal courts have held that
103 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
104 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) ("For purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug
trafficking crime' means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.").
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (authorizing punishment of "any person who ... in
furtherance of [a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime], possesses a
firearm .... ").
106 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (setting forth penalties for narcotics
manufacturing, possession, and distribution).
107 There is precedent for the argument that gun possession is a continuing offense
and that multiple prosecutions for such offense violate the prohibition of double
jeopardy. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 79 Ala. 257, 259 (1885) (interpreting statute
prohibiting individuals from carrying concealed firearms as creating a continuing
offense because "[a n y other interpretation would furnish no rule for determining into
how many indictable offenses one act of continuous carrying could be subdivided");
Simmons v. State, 899 P.2d 931, 936 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (holding defendant who
was seen possessing the same firearm twice in a four month period could not be
convicted twice under state felon-in-possession statute: "It appears to be a well-settled
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"possession" under § 924(c) includes both actual and constructive
possession. So long as the firearm remains under the defendant's
"dominion and control," it remains within his possession.10 8 Thus,
defendants have been found to possess firearms under § 924(c) when
the guns were found in the defendant's house,109 in a locked safe, 110 in
a locked convenience store bathroom,'' and even in the engine
compartment of a friend's rental car. 112 From the evidence presented
in the case, it appears that Angelos' gun remained continuously under
his "dominion and control" throughout the time period during which
the controlled buys occurred. Sometimes it was in his car, sometimes
it was on his person, and sometimes it was in his house. But it was
always in his possession. 113
Treating the firearms possession as the unit of prosecution for
§ 924(c) violations avoids some of the arbitrariness that results from
tying the unit of prosecution to the individual drug transaction. 14 As
proposition in felon-in-possession cases that the element of possession implies
continuity: 'Possession is a course of conduct, not an act; by prohibiting possession
Congress intended to punish as one offense all of the acts of dominion which
demonstrate a continuing possessory interest in a firearm"' (quoting United States v.
Jones, 533 F.2d 1387, 1391 (6th Cir. 1976))); Webb v. State, 311 Md. 610, 619 (1988)
(finding defendant seen twice in a three hour period with a gun in his possession
could not be convicted of two violations of statute prohibiting illegal wearing,
carrying, or transporting of firearm); Johnson v. Morgenthau, 505 N.E.2d 240, 242-43
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that defendant could not be prosecuted twice for
unlawful possession of same weapon at different times and places over a six-day
period); State v. Morejon, 675 A.2d 410, 412 (R.I. 1996) (stating possession of pistol
without a license was a continuing offense that could not be punished more than
once); cf. United States v. White, 222 F.3d 363, 363-73 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that it
violated double jeopardy to convict defendant of two violations of § 924(c) on ground
that he simultaneously possessed two firearms).
108 See, e.g., United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278, 1307 (lth Cir. 2014)
(sustaining conviction for conspiracy to constructively possess firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming
conviction under § 924(c) for constructive possession of firearm found in basement
apartment); United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming
conviction under Section 924(c) for constructive possession of firearm found on top
of entertainment center in defendant's home).
I10 United States v. Volkman, 736 F.3d 1013, 1025-26 (6th Cir. 2013).
III United States v. Brightwell, 104 F. App'x 823, 824 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd on other
grounds by Brightwell v. United States, 543 U.S. 1114 (2005).
112 United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir. 2007).
113 Government witnesses saw the gun in Angelos's car, on his person and in his
home. See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2004).
There was no evidence that the gun ever left his dominion and control.
114 This interpretation would not eliminate all arbitrariness from § 924(c)
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the Angelos case demonstrates, if the individual drug transaction is the
unit of prosecution, prosecutors and police will have the power to
procure virtually any prison sentence they wish simply by
manipulating the number of controlled buys.1 15 Had the informant in
Angelos purchased twenty-four ounces of marijuana in a single buy,
the government could only have obtained a five-year sentence for gun
possession. 16 By spreading the purchase over three eight-ounce
transactions and convincing Angelos to let police search his
apartment, the government was able to procure an astounding fifty-
year increase in his sentence.1 17 Had the government chosen to do six,
prosecutions because the statute also punishes the use or carrying of a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime. Neither using nor carrying a firearm seems to
imply the same continuity and duration as the crime of possession. Therefore, even
under the reading I am proposing, prosecutors could often tie the unit of prosecution
for § 924(c) violations to the individual drug transaction by charging the defendant
with using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Angelos
seems to have "carried" a firearm within the meaning of § 924(c) on at least two
occasions. See id.; see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1998)
(broadly defining "carries" under § 924(c) to include driving a car that contains a gun
inside it). A better way to eliminate arbitrariness might be to reinterpret the unit:of
prosecution for drug trafficking offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). See infra Part
III for more discussion of this point.
115 Law enforcement manipulation of a defendant's sentence has sometimes been
called "sentencing entrapment." See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and
Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 112 (2005); Eric P.
Berlin, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity:
Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 187, 215; Andrew G.
Deiss, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment: Prearrest Sentence Manipulation by
Investigators Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 419, 421; Jeffrey L.
Fisher, When Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing Pre-Arrest Sentence-
Manipulation Claims Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2385,
2389 (1996); Sandra Guerra, The New Sentencing Entrapment and Sentence
Manipulation Defenses, 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 181, 181 (1995).
The judicial response to the "sentencing entrapment" defense has been mixed. See,
e.g., Oliver v. State, No. 38115, 2011 WL 11047664, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 9,
2011) (reviewing case law and determining that this defense had "been adopted by
only a minority of federal jurisdictions and by appellate courts of only three states").
For a particularly egregious example of what appears to be a widespread federal
practice of sentencing entrapment, see United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th
Cir. 2014). Now that this practice has come to the attention of the public, it is being
abandoned in at least some federal districts. See Annie Sweeney & Jason Meisner,
Drug Sting Cases Dropped in Rare Reversal by Feds: Undercover Tactic Criticized as a
Way to Entrap Minorities, CHI. TRIB., January 30, 2015, at 1, available at 2015 WLNR
2954527 (on Westlaw).
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
117 See Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. This drastic increase occurred despite the
fact that Angelos was acquitted on two of the four additional 924(c) counts. See id.
Had the government won conviction on all five counts, Angelos's mandatory
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four-ounce transactions, it could have obtained a mandatory 130 year
sentence. Had it chosen twenty-four, one-ounce transactions, it could
have obtained a mandatory sentence of 580 years. And so on, ad
infinitum118 Treating the firearms possession as the unit of
prosecution avoids this danger.
Treating the firearms possession as the unit of prosecution also
makes it less likely that small-time drug dealers will receive sentences
that are excessive in relation to those given to more serious drug
offenders. For example, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute
provides a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years for major
drug offenders who "obtain[] substantial income or resources" by
engaging in a "continuing series" of drug offenses "in concert with five
or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a
position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of
management ...."119 Such offenders often cannot be shown to possess
a firearm in relation to the drug offense because they are high enough
in the narcotics organization that they never engage in street-level
drug transactions. If each individual drug transaction provides the unit
of prosecution for a § 924(c) violation, the lowest level members of a
drug organization may face a mandatory minimum sentence that is
many multiples of the minimum sentence facing their supervisors,
because they are most exposed to the risk that the government will
send an informant or undercover agent to engage in multiple
controlled buys.
minimum sentence would have been 105 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C).
118 Because § 924(c) defines "drug trafficking crime" to include virtually all federal
narcotics offenses, treating the individual drug transaction as the unit of prosecution
may create even more arbitrary results than those apparent in Angelos. For example,
21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2012) creates a separate crime for "lelach separate use of a
communication facility" in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Imagine that
Weldon Angelos had one or more telephone conversations with the undercover agent
to set up the first marijuana sale, and that during these conversations Angelos kept the
gun and the marijuana with him so that he could do the sale at a moment's notice. If
the drug trafficking offense provided the unit of prosecution, the first phone call
would add five years to Angelos's sentence and each additional call would add twenty-
five years. If Angelos and the agent had five telephone conversations to set up the first
marijuana sale, prosecutors could charge five § 924(c) violations and send Angelos to
jail for a minimum of 105 years even though Angelos never left his apartment and
neither the gun nor the drugs came anywhere near another human being.
119 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012).
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2. Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity
Although there are many advantages to treating firearm possession
as the unit of prosecution under § 924(c), this reading is not clearly
commanded by the text of the statute. Section 924(c) punishes anyone
who "possesses a firearm" "in furtherance of' a "drug trafficking
crime."1 20 It would be consistent with this text to treat either the
firearms possession or the drug transaction as the unit of prosecution.
Because either reading is textually plausible, Angelos would likely
win this argument only if the court applied the rule of lenity, which
holds that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should
be resolved in favor of lenity."' 21 Since it is possible to read § 924(c) to
make either the firearm possession or the drug transaction the unit of
prosecution, Angelos could argue, the court should apply the rule of
lenity and read the statute as focusing on the firearm possession.
This argument is not likely to win under the Supreme Court's
current rule of lenity jurisprudence. In recent decades, the Court has
treated the rule of lenity as a disfavored doctrine, holding that it "only
applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there
remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute, such that
the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended."' 122 As this
quote indicates, the Supreme Court is reluctant to apply the rule of
lenity even where there is significant statutory ambiguity.1 23
The weakness of the rule of lenity has arisen, in large part, from the
fact that we lack an adequate account of why we have the rule in the
first place. The current rationale for the rule of lenity is that it advances
procedural and structural values, but not any particular substantive
values. 124 The primary procedural value underlying the rule of lenity is
120 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
121 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
122 Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
123 See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice:
Some Latter-Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385, 397-98
(1987) ("[Tlhe idea of strict interpretation [of penal statutes] has suffered significant
erosion in the present century."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1083 (1989) (asserting that courts invoke the
rule of lenity in a "random" and "bizarre" manner); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal
Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 384 (" TIhe Court has never formally
repudiated lenity. But it has done something nearly as effective, adopting a doctrinal
formulation of the rule that poses no effective impediment to the exercise of delegated
lawmaking power by courts.").
124 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
57, 58 (1998) ("The motivating purpose of the rule is to provide adequate notice to
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supposed to be "notice." 125 The rule is said to reflect the idea that it is
unfair to punish a person for conduct whose illegality is not reasonably
apparent at the time the person engaged in it. In this sense, the rule of
lenity is like the void for vagueness doctrine. 126 The structural value
underlying the rule of lenity is said to be separation of powers. 127 The
rule is thought to reflect the idea that legislatures, not courts, are
supposed to write our criminal laws.128 It is not appropriate for a court
defendants (due process), and to reinforce the notion that only the legislature has the
power to define what conduct is criminal and what conduct is not (separation of
powers).").
125 See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (interpreting federal
motor vehicle theft statute not to authorize prosecution for theft of aircraft: "Although
it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he
murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed."); Kahan, supra note 123, at 349 (noting that "notice" is a
frequently cited justification for the rule of lenity); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 935-36 (1992); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471
(1989).
126 See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95 (1968)
(calling the rule of lenity a "junior version of the vagueness doctrine").
127 See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("The
rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly ... is founded ... on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department."). This claim was probably not correct as an historical matter. As
discussed infra Part ll.A.4, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes derived
from a time when most crimes were defined by the common law, not the legislature,
and it served to limit legislative efforts to expand criminal punishment beyond the
bounds set by the common law. As Dan Kahan has argued, the Wiltberger Court's
assertion about separation of powers may have had less to do with its understanding
of the historical basis for the rule of strict construction, and more to do with the
Supreme Court's recent declaration in United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,
34 (1812), that federal criminal jurisdiction (unlike state criminal jurisdiction) was
strictly limited to statutory offenses. See Kahan, supra note 123, at 360. The Wiltberger
Court's identification of separation of powers as a basis for the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes does not seem to have weakened the rule prior to the
instrumentalist revolution of the twentieth century because the Court recognized a
second rationale for the rule: "the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals."
As discussed infra Part lI.A.4, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes reflected
a systemic preference for life and liberty and a systemic bias against overpunishment.
Wiltberger's mention of the "rights of individuals" seems to refer to this preference.
Instrumentalist critics of the rule of strict construction of penal statutes did not
recognize the validity of this preference. See infra Part IV.A.2.
128 Dan Kahan describes this principle as "the nondelegation conception of lenity"
because it requires "Congress to shoulder the entire burden of criminal lawmaking
even when it prefers to cede some part of that task to courts." Kahan, supra note 123,
at 350.
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to convict a defendant of a crime that does not come within the terms
of a criminal statute, merely because the court believes that the
conviction will further the statute's purpose. As several commentators
have noted, both of these rationales are rather weak.1 29
The rule of lenity is neither an effective nor a necessary means to
ensure that defendants receive proper notice that their conduct is
illegal in most cases. When an offender engages in seriously wrongful
conduct, it does not seem unfair to punish him even when the
wording of a statute is vague or ambiguous. This is why mistake of law
is generally not a valid defense to prosecution. 130 Although lack of
notice could be a good reason to invalidate prosecution under a public
welfare statute for conduct that is not inherently wrongful,'3 ' it does
not seem to be a strong reason for exonerating defendants who
commit crimes that involve seriously wrongful conduct. Moreover, the
notice requirement itself is so weak and artificial that it appears to be
an inadequate basis for a strong rule of lenity.' 32 The Supreme Court
has held that the notice requirement is fulfilled if a statute is either
reasonably clear on its face or has been subjected to a "judicial gloss"
that clarifies any vague or ambiguous terms.133 As has often been
noted, criminals generally do not read the statute books to determine
whether their conduct is prohibited. 134 The idea that they would read
both the statute books and the case reports before deciding whether to
engage in criminal conduct is even more far-fetched. Since criminal
laws meet the "notice" requirement under circumstances that provide
129 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 219-20 (1985) ("Separation of powers might be
taken to mean that courts should make law only interstitially, but not that all change
must move in one direction. Nor is strict construction required for fair warning.");
Kahan, supra note 123, at 363 ("[Llenity cannot convincingly be understood as
advancing 'rule of law' values such as fair notice.").
130 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The
Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 758 (2014)
("The criminal law generally does not recognize an exculpatory mistake of law
doctrine today .... ").
131 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 227 (1957).
132 Professor Mila Sohoni has argued that the weakness and artificiality of the
notice requirement is partially the product of New Deal-era jurisprudential changes,
which "permit[ted] less clarity and predictability in the law" being challenged. Mila
Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1172 (2013).
133 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
134 See, e.g., Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 885, 886 (2004) (arguing that the notice rationale is flawed because "criminals
do not read statutes, and because even if they did it would not be clear that the legal
system should reward their efforts to skirt the law's borders").
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actual notice to almost none of the people whose conduct they govern,
it seems unnecessary to use a strong rule of lenity to advance this
requirement.
The rule of lenity does not consistently advance the separation of
powers either. When a criminal statute contains an ambiguity, the
Court must choose whether to adopt the broader or the narrower
reading of the ambiguous provision. This choice inescapably involves
a "rewriting" of the statute, because it reduces the provision's range of
possible meanings. Adoption of the narrower reading does not always
comport with the meaning intended by the legislature. 135
The weakness of the notice and separation of powers rationales for
the rule of lenity is demonstrated in two cases in which the Supreme
Court refused to apply the rule to ambiguous provisions of § 924(c):
Smith v. United States and Deal v. United States.
In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
of a man who was alleged to have "used" a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime by trying to sell a machine gun to
an undercover officer in exchange for two ounces of cocaine.' 36 Smith
argued that the word "use" was ambiguous - it could mean "use as a
weapon" or "use for any purpose" - and that the Court should
therefore apply the rule of lenity and interpret it to mean "use as a
weapon."' 137 The Court refused to apply the rule of lenity, noting that
Smith's conduct came within the dictionary definition of the word
"use."138 The Court also believed that a narrower reading of the statute
would frustrate the intent of Congress. 139 The Court noted that drugs
and guns are a "dangerous combination" and asserted that Congress
"was no doubt aware" of this fact. 140 Because "a firearm's use as a
135 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2193 (2002) ("[IIf one had to make an educated estimate (and given the premise
of ambiguity, one must), one might perhaps even conclude that in ambiguous cases the
legislature would likely prefer a 'rule of severity."'). Elhauge proposes an alternative
explanation for the rule of lenity, arguing that it is designed to enhance the clarity of
criminal statutes by provoking the legislature to respond to judicial decisions that
interpret criminal statutes more narrowly than the legislature prefers: "[T]he rule of
lenity forces the legislature to define just how anti-criminal they wish to be, and how far
to go with the interest in punishing crime when it runs up against other societal
interests." Id. at 2194; see also Price, supra note 134, at 886 (arguing that "narrow
construction may in fact thwart legislative desires more than it advances them").
136 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 226-27 (1993).
137 See id. at 228.
138 Id. at 228-29.
139 Id. at 240.
140 Id.
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weapon and its use as an item of barter ... create the very dangers and
risks that Congress meant § 924(c)(1) to address," the Court held, the
term "use" should be interpreted to cover both activities. 141
Similarly, in Deal v. United States, the Supreme Court gave a broad
interpretation to the language in § 924(c) that escalates the mandatory
punishment for a "second or subsequent conviction" from five to
twenty-five years.142 Deal argued that § 924(c) should be interpreted as
a typical recidivism statute that only escalates punishment when an
offender commits a crime after a prior conviction, thus demonstrating
that he failed to learn from his earlier conviction. 143 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, parsing the statutory text in a manner that was
both highly abstruse and highly questionable. 144 The Court also rejected
141 Id. at 240-41. These assertions about legislative purpose are questionable for
two reasons. First, it seems implausible to say that using a gun for barter creates the
very same level of risk as using a gun to fire upon or threaten someone. Both activities
create risk, but probably not the same degree of risk. Second, the Court cited no
evidence that Congress equated these two risks with each other. Although the Court
cited some statistics indicating that gun crime is often drug-related, it cited no
committee reports, floor debate, or other direct evidence that any member of Congress
- much less the entire legislative body - wanted to use § 924(c) to address every
possible situation involving drugs and guns. In other words, the Court's assessment of
the statute's "purpose" appears to be nothing more than an assessment of what "must
have been" the statute's purpose, which itself appears to be nothing more than the
Court's own assessment about the risks associated with drugs and guns. The Supreme
Court's apparent beliefs about the strong association of guns, drugs and violence may
have been overblown. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7, 33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2414202 (reviewing "independent empirical evidence,
historical and arrest data, and a review of prior research," and arguing that "it is
unclear that people who carry a gun while transacting drug deals cause more violence
than those who do not").
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2012) ("In the case of a second or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, the person shall.., be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 25 years."); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 134 (1993).
143 See Deal, 508 U.S. at 131; see also id. at 137-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Section 924(c) should be read as a traditional recidivism statute).
144 Recidivism statutes are often worded to impose heightened punishment for a
"second offense," and so they raise the same question as the one that arose in Deal:
Does "second offense" include a second charge brought in the same case as the first,
or does it only cover a conviction for an offense committed after a previous
conviction? Courts interpreting such statutes have held that "[iut cannot legally be
known that an offense has been committed until there has been a conviction" and
therefore "[a] second offense ... is one that has been committed after conviction for a
first offense." Id. at 139 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hoist v. Owens, 24 F.2d 100,
101 (5th Cir. 1928)). Deal argued that the phrase "second conviction" in
§ 924(c)(1)(C) should be read as a synonym for the phrase "second offense" in classic
recidivism statutes. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used hyper-textualist
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the idea that Congress' evident purpose was to escalate punishment only
for recidivists. 145 According to the Court, Congress may have believed
that those who repeatedly use guns to commit crimes, even without a
prior conviction, are more dangerous or blameworthy than other
criminals and thus deserve more punishment. 146 Any effort to determine
legislative purpose beyond what is shown in the text of the statute
would be purely speculative: "Once text is abandoned," it asserted,
judges have nothing to guide them other than intuition, and "one
intuition will serve as well as the other."' 47
Taken together, Smith and Deal vastly increased the scope and
severity of § 924(c). Deal in particular changed the nature of § 924(c)
prosecutions by enabling prosecutors to impose extraordinarily long
mandatory sentences even on first offenders. Weldon Angelos would
not be serving a fifty-five year sentence were it not for Deal.
Although Smith and Deal gave broad readings to ambiguous
statutory provisions, they cannot really be said to have violated the
principles of notice and separation of powers that are supposed to
justify the rule of lenity. Neither Smith nor Deal seems to have been
harmed by any lack of notice. Both engaged in seriously wrongful
reasoning to reject Deal's argument, asserting that purely as a textual matter, a
"conviction" is not precisely the same thing as an "offense": "The present statute ...
does not use the term 'offense,' so it cannot possibly be said that it requires a criminal
act after the first conviction. What it requires is a conviction after the first conviction."
Id. at 135 (majority opinion).
Justice Scalia's textual argument was flawed in at least two respects. First, the
narrower reading offered by Deal took better account of the temporal implications of
the words "second or subsequent" than the broader reading adopted by the Court.
When multiple § 924(c) convictions are obtained in a single case, it seems
counterintuitive to describe any of them as "second or subsequent" to the others.
Although the jury may or may not vote on the charges in a certain order, the judge
ultimately makes them all part of a single judgment of conviction, and all of the
convictions become effective simultaneously. It strains the English language to treat
one § 924(c) conviction as "subsequent" to the other when both are proven in the
same trial, voted upon at the same time, and become legally effective as part of a single
judicial order. Second, Justice Scalia's argument that on its face, "conviction" cannot
be a synonym for "offense" is a curious one. If a prior conviction is the thing that
allows a prior offense to be "legally known" for purposes of a recidivism statute, it
does not seem unreasonable to conclude that legislators intended the word
"conviction" as a synonym for "offense." As the Deal dissent pointed out, it appears
that for the first twenty years of its existence every judge and prosecutor who handled
a case under § 924(c)(1)(C) treated it as a traditional recidivism statute. See id. at 140-
42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 136 (majority opinion).
146 Id.
147 Id.
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conduct that they had every reason to know was unlawful. Neither
claimed that § 924(c)'s ambiguous language led them to believe they
were not violating the law or that they would not be punished as
harshly as they were. Nor was the Supreme Court's broad reading of
these provisions clearly less consistent with congressional intent than
a narrower reading would have been. Because the rule of lenity
contributes only marginally to the values of notice and separation of
powers, and because the Supreme Court has not identified any other
values it might serve, it has become a less and less important tool in
the Court's interpretive arsenal over the past several decades.
As we will see below, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes
(the proper name for the rule of lenity) was not originally based upon
the positivist assumptions underlying the Supreme Court's current
textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory construction. 4 It
was based upon the presumption that the legislature would not wish
to authorize a punishment that was arbitrary and excessive in relation
to the offender's culpability, measured against longstanding prior
practice. 149 For this reason, judges prior to the twentieth century did
not merely use the rule as a tiebreaker when the text itself yielded a
grievous ambiguity, but as an interpretive guide for determining
whether there was an ambiguity in the first place.
The Supreme Court's failure to see that the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes reflects a systemic bias against
overpunishment, based on basic principles of justice, explains why it
has adopted such broad readings of statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
and permitted such lengthy punishments. 150  When the Court
remembers the basic function of the rule, it may start employing it
more effectively. 15 1 But for now the rule of lenity is not effective, and
148 See infra Part I1.A.4.
149 See infra Part I1.A.4.
150 Justice Scalia's failure to recognize the prevention of excessive punishment as an
interpretive guide is evident from his dismissive treatment of the excessiveness issue
in Deal. Noting that a person who commits six armed bank robberies could
theoretically receive a 105-year prison term even under the narrower reading of
§ 924(c)(1)(C), Scalia elected not to "tarry" over the question of whether the broader
reading of § 924(c)(1)(C) permitted imposition of excessive punishments. As a result,
Justice Scalia apparently failed to consider the effect the broader interpretation of
§ 924(c)(1)(C) would have on numerous defendants like Angelos, whose maximum
possible sentence would be far shorter under the narrower reading.
151 See infra CONCLUSION; see also Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and
Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 934, 940 (2005) (arguing that the weakness of the
rule of lenity in the federal system results from the fact that "federal courts are ...
often oblivious to the penal consequences of their interpretive decisions" and that "the
rule of lenity remains necessary today as a mechanism for mitigating the severity of
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an offender like Angelos is not likely to succeed in his argument that
"gun possession" should provide the unit of prosecution. Although the
text of the statute is ambiguous regarding the appropriate unit of
prosecution, Smith and Deal demonstrate that the Court believes that
Congress wants § 924(c) to be construed broadly to accomplish its
purpose of incapacitating drug dealers who use guns.
II. THE COMMON LAW AND EXCESS: THREE SUBSTANTIVE DOCTRINES
The preceding discussion showed the current state of three
seemingly empty doctrines: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause's prohibition of excessive punishments, the Double Jeopardy
Clause's prohibition of multiple punishments, and the rule of lenity.
This Part shows that these doctrines actually have a strong - but
forgotten - normative basis. The foundational purpose of all three
doctrines is the prevention of excessive punishment, measured against
a baseline of longstanding common law practice. 152 Prior to the
twentieth century, judges used all three doctrines as tools for
constraining prosecutorial efforts to divide crimes and obtain multiple
punishments. 153 Judges rejected the government's proposed unit of
prosecution when they found it would give the government the
opportunity to bring numerous charges based upon a single course of
conduct, and thus create an arbitrary relationship between the
offender's culpability and his punishment.'5 4
A. Preventing Excessive Punishments
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and the rule of strict construction of penal statutes are all
based, in part, upon the common law prohibition of excessive
punishments. 155 Each doctrine will be discussed in turn, but first we
will discuss their common grounding in the common law.
1. The Common Law Basis for the Three Doctrines
When we think about the common law today, we tend to have two
competing images in our minds, both derived largely from the writings
of Oliver Wendell Holmes. On the one hand, we think of it as judge-
existing criminal sanctions").
152 See infra Part II.A.
153 See infra Part Ll.B.
154 See infra Part lI.B.
155 See infra Part I1.A.2-4.
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made law. In Holmes' words, common law judges exercise a
"legislative function," making up rules as they go along based on their
own views of what is best for society. 56 At the same time, we often
think of the common law as a series of fixed, almost-transcendent
rules shared among all common law countries - a kind of "brooding
omnipresence in the sky." 1 5 7 Neither of these views is correct, at least
as an historical matter.
Over the course of its long history prior to Holmes, the common law
was neither regarded as judicial legislation nor as a Platonic ideal. No
one argued that the common law was based upon a judicial power to
make law; nor did they claim that the common law was revealed from
on high. Instead, the common law was considered to be a kind of
customary law, the law of "custom and long usage."158 The basic idea
was that if a legal practice were used throughout the jurisdiction for a
very long time, it attained the force of law despite the fact that it had
never been ordered by the sovereign. "Long usage" was thought to
provide powerful evidence that the practice was just, that it fit the
practical needs of society, and that it enjoyed the consent of the
people. 159 If the legal practice lacked any of these qualities, it was
argued, the practice would fall out of usage and cease to be part of the
common law.160
156 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1881).
157 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
158 See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual," supra note 12, at 1775-76,
1790-92; see, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *73 (noting that "the first
ground and chief corner stone of the laws of England" was "general immemorial
custom, or common law, from time to time declared in the decisions of the courts of
justice"); EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER (1630), reprinted in 2 THE
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 563, 563 (Steve Sheppard ed.,
2003) [hereinafter COMPLEAT COPYHOLDERI ("Customes are defined to be a Law, or
Right not written, which being established by long use, and the consent of our
Ancestors, hath been, and is daily practised."); JOHN DAVIES, A Preface Dedicatory, in
LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES & MATTERS EN LEY RESOLUES & ADIUDGES EN LES COURTS
DEL ROY EN IRELAND *2 (Dublin, 1615) ("For the Common lawe of England is nothing
else but the Common custome of the Realme .. "); JAMES WILSON, LECTURES ON LAW:
OF THE COMMON LAW, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OFJAMES WILSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 423, 435-36 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) (" [L]ong customs, approved by the consent of those
who use them, acquire the qualities of a law.").
159 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at *63-64, *68-69, *79-80 (describing
the normative power of long usage); COKE, COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER, supra note 158, at
563; WILSON, supra note 158, at 435-36.
160 See, e.g., COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND: OR
A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, NOT THE NAME OF THE AUTHOR ONLY, BUT OF THE LAW
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The idea of long usage carried great normative power. Common law
thinkers often compared new statutes and edicts unfavorably with the
common law because they lacked long usage. 161 Statutes and edicts
became law before being used, common law thinkers argued, and
therefore they often turned out to be unjust or unreasonable in
application. Common law practices, on the other hand, did not
become law until long usage had shown them to be just, effective, and
agreeable to the people, and they fell out of usage if they no longer
met the needs of society.1 62 For these reasons, legal thinkers
considered the common law normatively superior to laws that derived
from the command of parliament or the king. The great common law
jurist Edward Coke even suggested that the common law could
"controul" unreasonable statutes and make them "void."163
This view of the relationship between the common law and
sovereign command was important because it gave rise to the idea of
rights enforceable against the state. 164 If king or parliament issued a
command that deviated from the common law in a manner that was
IT SELFE (1628), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD
COKE, supra note 158, at, 577, 740 [hereinafter INSTITUTES] (describing legal practices
that fall out of usage as the "drosse" of the law); DAVIES, supra note 158, at *2
(asserting that unjust or ineffective legal practices eventually fall out of usage and
cease to be part of the common law).
161 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at *69 (asserting that when a statute is
enacted to change a common law rule, the typical result is that "the wisdom of the
rule hath in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the
innovation"); COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 160, at 740 ("[W]hen any innovation or
new invention starts up ... trie it with the Rules of the common Law ... for these be
true Touchstones to sever the pure gold from the drosse and sophistications of
novelties and new inventions. And by this example you may perceive, That the rule of
the old common Law being soundly .. applied to such novelties, it doth utterly crush
them and bring them to nothing .. "); WILSON, supra note 158, at 453 ("It is the
characteristic of a system of common law that it be accommodated to the
circumstances, the exigencies, and the conveniences of the people, by whom it is
appointed.").
162 See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 158, at *2 ("And this Custumary lawe is the most
perfect, & most excellent, and without comparison the best, to make & preserve a
commonwealth, for the written lawes which are made either by the edicts of Princes,
or by Counselles of estate, are imposed uppon the subject before any Triall or
Probation made, whether the same bee Fitt & agreeable to the nature & disposition of
the people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience or no. But a Custome doth
never become a lawe to binde the people, untill it hath bin tried & approved time out
of minde.").
163 See 1 EDWARD COKE, REPORTS: DR. BONHAM'S CASE, reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 158, at 264, 264 [hereinafter
DR. BONHAM'S CASE].
164 See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual," supra note 12, at 1771-1810.
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fundamentally unjust, subjects argued that this command was illegal
because it was "unusual," that is, contrary to long usage. t65 This way
of thinking motivated both the American Revolution 166 and the
decision to adopt the Bill of Rights after ratification of the United
States Constitution. 67 Many of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights
derived from the common law, including the prohibitions of cruel and
unusual punishments and double jeopardy. These provisions were
written into the Constitution to ensure that no branch of government
exceeded the bounds of justice established by longstanding prior
practice. 168 Similarly, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes
was a common law doctrine that reflected a systemic bias against
overpunishment1 69 The rule required courts to narrowly construe
penal statutes that were harsher than prior common law practice.
2. Excessive Punishments and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally meant, in
large part, to prohibit punishments that are harsher than the offender
deserves as a retributive matter. 170 Courts are able to determine
whether a punishment is excessive by comparing it to punishment
practices that enjoy long usage, and that are thus presumptively
reasonable under the common law ideology described above. 171
The very text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
references the common law. 172 The word "unusual" is a legal term of
art that means "contrary to long usage," or "contrary to longstanding
common law practice." 173 The phrase "cruel and unusual" means
165 See id. at 1784-85.
166 See id. at 1792-1800.
167 See id. at 1800-10.
168 See id.
169 See infra Part IL.A.4.
170 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 926-27.
171 See id. at 961-73.
172 In prior articles, I have demonstrated that the word "unusual" in the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause originally meant "contrary to the long usage of the
common law;" that the Clause was originally meant to prohibit new punishment
practices that are unduly harsh in light prior practice; and that this prohibition
included not only barbaric punishment methods, but also excessive or
disproportionate punishments. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note
11, at 907; Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual," supra note 12, at 1814-17. I
will not rehearse the proof for these conclusions here, but will simply describe what
the Clause originally meant and how it operated in practice.
173 See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual," supra note 12, at 1764.
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"cruel and new," or "cruel in light of longstanding common law
practice." 174 A punishment is cruel and unusual if it is new and
significantly harsher than the punishments that came before it.
A traditional punishment can become cruel and unusual if it falls
out of usage for a long period of time and is then reintroduced by a
legislature. 175 For example, the death penalty for theft was once
permissible at common law, but would now almost certainly be cruel
and unusual if a legislature tried to bring it back. 176 The key question
is whether the once-traditional punishment is significantly harsher
than the practices that replaced it after it fell out of usage.
One kind of cruel and unusual punishment is a punishment that
utilizes barbaric methods. For example, when English monarchs
started using the rack to torture those accused of crime, common
lawyers argued that this practice was illegal because it was contrary to
the long usage of the common law. 177 Similarly, during the debates
over ratification of the United States Constitution, Antifederalists
argued that unless the Constitution were amended to recognize
common law rights like the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments, Congress might adopt barbaric methods of punishment
such as "racks" and "gibbets." 178
Another kind of cruel and unusual punishment is an excessive
punishment. Excessive punishments do not necessarily involve
impermissible methods; rather, they are cruel and unusual because
they are unreasonably harsh in relation to the justification for
punishing a given offense. 179 For example, a life sentence for a parking
violation is cruel and unusual because it is much harsher than the
offender deserves for this offense. 180
As described above, the Supreme Court currently takes the position
that legislatures are not bound to recognize any particular justification
for punishment, nor the limitations this justification would imply.
Criminal statutes may be based on retributive justice, deterrence,
174 See John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 531, 558 (2014) [hereinafter Death]; Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality,
supra note 11, at 907-09.
175 See Stinneford, Death, supra note 174, at 590.
176 Id. at 592-93.
177 See, e.g., COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 160, at 1025 (asserting that the use of
rack was unlawful because contrary to long usage).
178 See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(statement of Abraham Holmes), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881).
179 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 962, 968.
180 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.ll (1980).
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incapacitation, rehabilitation, or even a purely regulatory purpose.' 8t
This position is contrary to the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. Writers from Bracton to Blackstone
declared that punishment is unjustified unless it is based upon an
offender's moral culpability.182 The entire fabric of common law
crimes and defenses reflects the culpability requirement. 8 3 The same
is also true of the various criminal procedural protections built into
the constitutional text itself. 184
Early cases decided under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause or a state analogue held punishments unconstitutional if they
exceeded the offender's moral desert. In Ely v. Thompson,185 for
example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals invalidated a statute making
it a crime for a person of color to lift his hand to a white person, even
in self-defense. The common law recognized a natural right to self-
defense: Persons who used proportionate force to defend themselves
against a wrongful attack could not be criminally punished because
they lacked moral culpability. 86 Because the statute's withdrawal of
the right to self-defense allowed the punishment of people who lacked
moral culpability, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that it was
"cruel indeed" and therefore invalid. 187 Similarly, in Weems v. United
States - the first case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States declared a punishment to be cruel and unusual - the Court
found that twelve years imprisonment at hard labor was excessive for a
crime that required a showing of neither harm nor intent to harm.188
Because an offender could be convicted with only a minimal showing
of moral culpability, the punishment "amaze[d] those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and
believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to offense."189
181 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 914-17.
182 See id. at 927-28, 963; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17 ("It
is ... absurd and impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes of different
malignity."); 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 299
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968).
183 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 963-64.
184 See id. at 964-66.
185 Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70 (1820).
186 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 182, at *183-85.
187 Ely, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) at 74.
188 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363 (1910).
189 Id. at 366-67.
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The method for determining whether a punishment practice is
excessive under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is
relatively simple and straightforward. First, the Court should ask
whether the practice is "unusual."'190 If the practice is new, or is a once-
traditional practice that fell out of usage long ago, the answer to this
question is yes. Second, the court should compare this punishment to
those that came before it for the same or similar crimes. 19' If it is
significantly harsher, it is presumptively cruel and unusual.
As demonstrated below, the practice of dividing crimes and
multiplying punishments is contrary to longstanding prior practice
and leads to much harsher results. Many of the punishments resulting
from this practice are cruel and unusual.
3. Multiple Punishments and Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "No person shall ... be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' 192 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the Clause protects against the risk
of unjust punishment that arises when the government brings multiple
charges against an offender for the same offense.193 At the same time,
the Court has held that legislatures are free to authorize multiple
punishments for the same offense and to create multiple statutory
offenses that cover exactly the same conduct. 194 If this is correct, the
Double Jeopardy Clause constrains prosecutors, but not legislatures.19 5
The historical record supports the conclusion that the Double
Jeopardy Clause was originally meant, at least in part, to prohibit
multiple punishments. It is less clear whether the Clause was originally
meant to constrain legislatures as well as prosecutors, because the
Clause was drafted in an era when statutory offenses were few and
tended not to overlap. 196 Early double jeopardy claims were based on
190 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 968.
191 See id. at 971-72.
192 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
193 See supra Part I.C. 1.
194 See supra Part 1.C.1.
195 See, e.g., Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 267 (1965) (arguing that the
core policy" of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to "prevent prosecutors and courts
from prosecuting and punishing arbitrarily, without legitimate justification").
196 See, e.g., THOMAS Ill, supra note 44, at 71 ("Much evidence exists of a double
jeopardy bar on prosecutors and judges, but there is almost no evidence that the bar
extended to the lawgiver."); Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106
YALE LJ. 1807, 1818 (1997) ("[Tihe Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no limits on
how the legislature may carve up conduct into discrete legal offense units."). There is
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improper prosecutorial or judicial conduct, not improper legislation.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that the Clause was
meant to restrain the legislature as well as prosecutors and judges.
The principle that a person should not be punished twice for the
same offense has been recognized, at least to some degree, in multiple
legal systems throughout recorded history. The Digest of Justinian, for
example, states that under Roman law "the governor must not allow a
man to be charged with the offenses of which he has already been
acquitted."'197 In the fourth century, St. Jerome interpreted a passage in
the Book of Nahum to mean that God would not inflict punishment
twice for the same offense, an interpretation that was later
incorporated into canon law.198 The same principle has also been
found in ancient Hebrew and Greek law.199
The principle seems to have already been a part of English common
law as early as the thirteenth century. 200 At that time, a criminal case
little direct evidence as to whether the double jeopardy bar was or was not intended to
constrain the legislative as well as the judicial and executive branches. Because
criminal law was largely the product of common law adjudication prior to the
nineteenth century, there would have been few early occasions for the double
jeopardy bar to come into conflict with legislative prerogative. Thomas interprets this
lack of evidence as support for his claim that the legislature was not bound by double
jeopardy rules: "Legislative prerogative regarding offense and jeopardy is so pervasive
that direct evidence of it is hard to uncover." THOMAS III, supra note 44, at 71.
197 JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 2 (1969) (quoting DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN). For discussion of the Roman
treatment of the multiple trial/multiple punishment problem, see id. 2-3; David S.
Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 193, 199-200 (2005).
198 See, e.g., SIGLER, supra note 197, at 3 (citing FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK
WILLIAM MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-49 (Cambridge, Univ. Press
1899)) (discussing St. Jerome's reading of the Book of Nahum); Rudstein, supra note
197, at 200-01. The Book of Nahum (as presented in the Douay translation of the
Bible) says: "There shall not rise up a double affliction." Nahum 1:9 (Douay-Rheims).
199 See Rudstein, supra note 197, at 197-99; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F.
Andrew Hessick, Double jeopardy as a Limit on Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 51
& n.20 (2011).
200 Although the principle that no one should face the risk of more than one
punishment for the same offense has been recognized more or less continuously
throughout English and American history, there have always been a variety of
exceptions and limitations to this rule. Because it is not the purpose of this article to
set forth a comprehensive history or theory of double jeopardy, the article does not
discuss many of these exceptions and limitations. For a more complete discussion of
the history and scope of the double jeopardy principle in English and American Law,
see generally SIGLER, supra note 197, at 1-38; THOMAS III, supra note 44, at 27-32, 71-
86; Rudstein, supra note 197, at 194-241.
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could be brought by the King or by a private party.20 1 A criminal case
brought by a private party was called an "appeal." 20 2 This two-track
system of prosecution created a risk that the King and the private
party would bring separate actions against the defendant, potentially
subjecting him to multiple punishments, or to punishment for a crime
of which he had been acquitted. Common law rules developed to
prevent this from happening. For example, Bracton wrote that if a
defendant "has been appealed by several of one deed and one wound,
and successfully makes his defence against one, he will depart quit
against all [the other appellors], also as regards the king's suit, because
he thereby proves his innocence against all, as though he had put
himself on the country and it had exonerated him completely." 20 3
The great seventeenth century common law thinker Edward Coke
asserted that the common law forbade multiple punishments for a
single offense, stating in Dr. Bonham's Case that "the Law saith, Nemo
debet bis puniri pro uno delicto." 20 4 This maxim translates into
English as: "No one ought to be punished twice for one offence." 205
This principle was embodied in four common law "pleas in bar" that
seem to have been the direct predecessors of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 206 The two most important were the pleas of auterfois acquit
and auterfois convict.207 These pleas permitted a defendant to avoid
prosecution if he had previously been acquitted or convicted of the
same offense.
The rules governing these pleas indicate that their purpose was to
negate the risk of overpunishment arising from multiple trials, not the
emotional or financial impact of the trials themselves. For example, a
prior acquittal was not considered a bar to a subsequent prosecution if
the first trial occurred in a court that lacked jurisdiction,208 or if the
201 THOMAS Il, supra note 44, at 77.
202 See id.
203 See BRACTON, supra note 182, at 391.
204 COKE, DR. BONHAM'S CASE, supra note 163, at 277.
205 Id. at 277 n.55 (editor's translation). Coke has been credited as one of the most
important figures in the development of modern double jeopardy because he clarified
that the principle applied to criminal actions imposing a threat of punishment, even
where the punishment is relatively minor. See, e.g., SIGLER, supra note 197, at 19-20
(discussing Coke's importance to double jeopardy law).
206 These were the pleas of auterfois acquit, auterfois convict, auterfois attaint, and
pardon. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 182, at *335-37 (describing these pleas).
207 See id. at *335-36.
208 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR, A SYSTEM OF
THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 370
(1972).
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first indictment was so faulty that it could not properly support a
conviction 20 9 because the first court theoretically lacked the authority
to impose punishment. 210 On the other hand, a prior acquittal could
sometimes be a bar to a second trial even where the first trial was
technically for a separate offense. For example, eighteenth century
treatise writer William Hawkins wrote that if a man stole goods in one
county and brought those goods into another county, he committed
two separate theft crimes "by a meer fiction or construction of the
law."211 Nonetheless, a defendant who had been acquitted of theft in
the county from which the goods were taken could raise a plea of
auterfoits acquit if he were subsequently prosecuted in the county to
which he took the goods, for a legal fiction could not prevail against "a
Maxim made in favour of Life." 21 2 Because these two crimes were the
same in substance, the mere fact that the law defined them as separate
crimes was not sufficient to justify putting the defendant at risk of
punishment a second time.
There is limited evidence as to how the framers and ratifiers of the
Bill of Rights viewed the purpose and scope of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 21 3 As Carissa Hessick and Andrew Hessick have shown, this
evidence tends to support the conclusion that the Double Jeopardy
Clause was intended to prevent multiple punishments for the same
offense. 214 When James Madison proposed the amendment to the First
Congress, he used the following language: "No person shall be subject,
except in case of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one
trial for the same offence." 2 15 In the debate over the amendment in the
House of Representatives, Representative Egbert Benson objected to
209 Id. at 372.
210 These rules were rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ball v.
United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1896), on the ground that they were too artificial.
In reality, people get convicted and punished all the time on the basis of faulty
indictments.
211 2 HAWKINS, supra note 208, at 370.
212 Id.
213 David Rudstein has given a nice summary of the available evidence. See
Rudstein, supra note 197, at 226-32; see, e.g., Donald Eric Burton, A Closer Look at the
Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 799, 801 (1988);
Charles L. Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 24 S. TEX L. REV. 735, 796 (1983) (discussing historical
evidence).
214 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 199, at 51-52. For further discussions of the
debates in the First Congress concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause, see SIGLER,
supra note 197, at 30-33.
215 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); DAVID S. RUDSTEIN,
DOUBLEJEOPARDY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14 (2004).
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the phrase "or one trial" because this language might be interpreted to
deny defendants the right to seek a new trial due to error in the first
trial. Benson "presumed [Madison's proposed language] was intended
to express what was secured by our former constitution, that no man's
life should be more than once put in jeopardy for the same offence....
The humane intention of the clause was to prevent more than one
punishment. ' 216 Benson's objection failed to carry the day in the
House, but the Senate ultimately changed the language of the
proposed amendment to language that reflected Benson's description
of the Clause's purpose: "No person shall ... be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 217 In sum, the
limited evidence indicates that the First Congress believed that it was
adopting a double jeopardy right that was closely analogous to the one
that existed under the English Constitution, as expressed in Coke's
"nemo debet bis puniri" maxim and the pleas of auterfoits acquit and
convict.218 It also appears that the First Congress understood a major
purpose of this right to be the prevention of multiple punishments.
The Supreme Court of the United States decided very few double
jeopardy cases in the first century after adoption of the Fifth
Amendment. The "multiple punishments" issue was first presented in
Ex parte Lange.219 In that case, the defendant was convicted of stealing
a mailbag belonging to the United States Postal Service, the value of
216 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 781-82. Benson's reference to being "twice put in jeopardy"
closely tracks the language used by Blackstone and Coke to describe the pleas of
auterfoits acquit and convict. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 182, at *335 (noting that
both pleas were based on the principle that "no man is to be brought into jeopardy
more than once for the same offence"); EDWARD COKE, REPORTS: VAUX'S CASE (1591),
reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note
158, at 112 115 ("[TIhe Maxim of Common Law is, that the life of a man shall not be
twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offence, and that is the reason and cause
that Auterfoits acquitted or convicted of the same offence is a good plea.").
Representatives Sherman and Sedgwick vocally supported Benson's motion to remove
the "or one trial" language for the reasons stated by Benson. Representative Livermore
spoke against removing the language on the ground that he did not believe it would be
interpreted in the way that Benson feared. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782. Benson's
motion to change the language of the proposed amendment lost, but no one expressed
disagreement with his assertion that the purpose of Madison's proposed amendment
was to prevent multiple punishments.
217 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
218 The American version of the right likely differed from its eighteenth century
English counterpart in that the American constitutional order was designed to
constrain the power of the legislature, whereas late eighteenth century England was a
system of parliamentary supremacy. See infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
219 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
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which was less than $25.220 The statute stated that the punishment for
this offense was "imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of
not less than ten dollars nor more than two hundred dollars." 221 At
sentencing, however, the judge ordered him to serve "one year's
imprisonment, and to pay two hundred dollars fine."222 The Supreme
Court held that this punishment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause,
asserting that "[i]f there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of
England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished
for the same offence." 223
The fact that the Double Jeopardy Clause was originally directed
against the risk of multiple punishments for the same offense does not
necessarily mean that it was intended to constrain the legislature in
the definition of crimes and authorization of punishments. The history
of the Clause does not directly contradict the idea that it was meant to
constrain prosecutors and judges, but not legislatures. For example,
the multiple punishment issue in Lange arose from the fact that the
judge imposed two punishments where the statute only authorized
one.224 Had the legislature authorized both punishments, Lange would
likely not have been able to raise a successful double jeopardy claim.
On the other hand, the idea that the Double Jeopardy Clause gives
legislatures total freedom to create overlapping offenses and authorize
multiple punishments puts the Clause in tension with the prohibition
of excessive punishments under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. As discussed above, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was originally meant to forbid legislatures from authorizing
new punishments that are significantly harsher than those that came
before for the same or similar offenses. 225 It seems strange to say that
the Constitution prohibits the legislature from making drastic
departures from prior punishment practice but simultaneously permits
legislatures total freedom to create overlapping offenses and to
authorize multiple punishments for the same offense.
The founding generation was very much concerned about the need
to constrain legislatures, and associated legislative freedom to create
new offenses with the risk of excessive punishment. For example,
during the run-up to the American Revolution, John Adams
220 Id. at 164.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 168.
224 Id. at 164.
225 See supra Part II.A.2; see also Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note
11, at 926-27.
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complained that Parliament had abused its power by creating multiple
offenses and authorizing harsh punishments under the Stamp Act:
"[Tihe Stamp Act has opened a vast number of sources of new crimes,
which may be committed by any man... and prodigious penalties are
annexed." 226 Similarly, during the debate over ratification of the United
States Constitution, George Mason argued that without a Bill of Rights
"Congress may... constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe
punishments, and extend their powers.., as far as they shall think
proper; so that . . . the people [have no security for] for their rights." 227
Given the complementary nature of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause, as well as the
founding generation's concern that legislative freedom to create new
crimes and authorize new punishments could lead to abuse, it seems
fair to conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause was originally meant
to impose some kind of constraint on the legislature. 228 The Supreme
Court made a valiant but short-lived effort to enforce such a constraint
in Grady v. Corbin.229 It is beyond the scope of this article to work out
the full nature and scope of such a constraint 230 - but the fact that
such a constraint exists can at least guide courts in the interpretation
of penal statutes that create a risk of multiple punishment for the same
offense. This process of interpretation is discussed immediately below,
and again in Part II.B.3.
4. The Rule of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes
The Supreme Court recognizes a canon of statutory construction
that requires ambiguous criminal statutes to be narrowly construed -
a canon it generally calls the rule of lenity - but applies the canon
rarely, inconsistently, and as a matter of last resort. 231 Because the
226 See John Adams, Instructions of the Town of Braintree to Their Representative,
1765, Bos. GAZETTE, Oct. 14, 1765, reprinted in 3 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORK
OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,
NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 465, 466-67 (Boston, Little & Brown 1851).
227 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 640 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
228 See Klein, supra note 44, at 1023 ("An interpretation of double jeopardy that
allows Congress or state legislatures to determine its meaning is anomalous at a deep
structural level - so anomalous that the proponent of this position assumes an
extraordinary burden of proof.").
229 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
230 See infra Part 11.B (containing a preliminary and tentative sketch of what such
constraints might look like).
231 See supra Part I.C.2.
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Court believes that the rule of lenity was intended primarily to
advance the values of notice and separation of powers, it refuses to
apply the rule in the many cases where it does not seem to advance
those values. 232
The name "rule of lenity" is an historical misnomer. This phrase
seems to have first appeared in 1958, in a case denigrating the rule and
denying its applicability. 233 Prior to the 1950s, the rule of lenity was
called the rule of strict construction of penal statutes.234 This rule was
not primarily about notice or separation of powers; nor was it about
giving criminals undeserved "lenience." Rather, it reflected the
common law's systemic bias in favor of life and liberty, and against
overpunishment. 235
Common law thinkers argued that the common law was
normatively superior to statutory law because the common law was
232 See supra Part I.C.2.
233 See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 391 (1958) ("It is one thing for a single
transaction to include several units relating to proscribed conduct under a single
provision of a statute. It is a wholly different thing to evolve a rule of lenity for three
violations of three separate offenses created by Congress at three different times, all to
the end of dealing more and more strictly with, and seeking to throttle more and more
by different legal devices, the traffic in narcotics."). A search of Westlaw ALLFEDS
and ALLSTATES databases reveals no cases in which this phrase was used prior to
Gore. The word "lenity" appears to have first been used in place of "strict
construction" in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955), stating: "When Congress
leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." Justice Frankfurter was the author of
both opinions, a fact that led Lawrence Solan to quip: "Frankfurter may not have
invented the rule [of lenity], but he apparently did name it." See Solan, supra note
124, at 103.
234 See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 77 (1820)
(discussing rule of strict construction of penal statutes).
235 Several scholars have defended the modern rule of lenity based on the idea that
it promotes liberty. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE
READING OF STATUTES, reprinted in BENCHMARKS 196, 209-10 (1967) (defending the
rule of lenity as a source of protection for liberty); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You
Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV.
561, 570-71 (1992).
On the other hand, Dan Kahan (among others) has harshly criticized the liberty-
based rationale for the rule of lenity. See Kahan, supra note 123, at 415 ("[A] generic
bias in favor of individual liberty has little to recommend it as a strategy for
construing criminal statutes. The class of persons who benefit from narrow readings of
federal criminal statutes includes a great many individuals who have deliberately
engaged in socially undesirable conduct but who hope to avoid punishment on the
basis of an unanticipated gap in the law. A rule that systematically sought to protect
these individuals through narrow construction would systematically disadvantage the
persons whose rights these individuals have violated.").
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the product of long usage. 236 The fact that common law practices did
not become law until they had been used within the jurisdiction for a
long time was thought to show that the practices were just,
reasonable, and enjoyed the consent of the people. 237 Statutory law, by
contrast, became law before it had ever been used, and was thus likely
to create inconvenience or even injustice. 238 This mode of reasoning
gave rise to the concept of customary rights that constrained the
power of the sovereign, including the right not to be subjected to cruel
and unusual punishments. 239
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes arose directly from
this mode of reasoning, as did the more general rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. 240 Since
the common law was thought to comport with basic principles of
justice, judges read criminal statutes that changed common law rules
narrowly so as to minimize the potential inconvenience and injustice
the new statutes otherwise might cause. 241 Strict construction of penal
statutes was not focused on actual legislative intent, but it was not
thought to be inconsistent with legislative intent either. Instead, the
rule of strict construction of penal statutes was based on the
presumption that the legislature would want the new penal statute to
be interpreted consistently with basic principles of justice as revealed
through the long usage of the common law. 242 Thus, R.H. Helmholz
characterized Coke's famous statement in Bonham's Case that the
common law could "controul" an unreasonable statute and make it
"void" as an example of strict construction of statutes in derogation of
the common law: "[f one assumed that the legislator wished to have
statutes read in light of natural law, and that the legislator had not in
fact intended to stray from its paths, then a decision in the case could
236 See supra Part II.A.1.
237 See supra Part H.A.I.
238 See supra Part II.A.1.
239 See supra Part II.A.1.
240 See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process As
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1690 (2012) (discussing rule of strict
construction of statutes in derogation of the common law).
241 See Solan, supra note 124, at 88-89 ("[TIhe strict construction of penal statutes
came into play when a judiciary disapproved of legislative harshness it regarded as
cruel. Thus, it used lenity to thwart, not promote, the will of the legislature.").
242 A similar idea was expressed in Chief justice Marshall's famous dictum in
United States v. Fisher: "Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are
overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative
intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to
suppose a design to effect such objects." 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805).
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be made in accordance with a reading of the statute that allowed
natural justice to be done." 243
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes was not value-free.
Rather, it reflected a systemic preference for life and liberty and a
systemic bias against overpunishment. Although the rule is an old one
- "perhaps not much less old than construction itself," as Chief
Justice Marshall suggested244 - it came to prominence during the
seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, as courts responded to
Parliament's efforts to increase the severity of criminal punishment.245
One of the ways Parliament made criminal punishment more severe
was by transforming numerous crimes into capital offenses, including
minor crimes like cutting down a tree in an orchard. 246 The severity of
these new laws was mitigated, however, by the longstanding doctrine
of benefit of clergy. This doctrine originally precluded the state from
trying members of the clergy in secular courts, but was transformed
over the years to preclude capital punishment for clergy members,
then for all first offenders who could read (or pretend to read) a
particular passage of scripture, 247 then for all first offenders convicted
243 R.H. Helmholz, Bonham's Case, judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 325, 339 (2009). Justice Story expressed a similar idea when explaining his
reason for applying the rule of strict construction of penal statutes in United States v.
Shackford, 27 F. Cas. 1038 (C.C.D. Me. 1830) (" [1f one construction be exceedingly
inconvenient, and the other safe and convenient, a fortiori ought the latter to be
deemed the true exposition of the legislative intention; for it can never be presumed
that the government means to impose irksome regulations, unless for some known
object, or from some express declaration.").
244 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
245 See, e.g., Ross E. Davies, A Public Trust Exception to the Rule of Lenity, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996) ("The Rule flowered in the eighteenth century in resporise
to the rapid expansion of the category of capital offenses.").
246 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 182, at *4 (describing parliament's authorization
of capital punishment for numerous minor offenses, including the crime of cutting
down "a cherry-tree in an orchard."); see, e.g., JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY
114-18 (Bobbs-Merrill 2d ed., 1952) (discussing expansion of capital punishment in
eighteenth and nineteenth century England); Erik Luna, Spoiled Rotten Social
Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 23, 34 (2011) (arguing that "England's 'Bloody
Code' attempted to manage the lower classes through the threat of capital
punishment, with the number of executable offenses increasing dramatically during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, predominantly for property crimes
committed by the British poor").
247 The history of the "neck verse" - the passage of scripture that was invariably
used to determine literacy (and thus eligibility for benefit of scripture) - is discussed
by various scholars, including J.S. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES 1558-
1714, at 128 (1972).
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of "clergyable" offenses. 248 Early on, some of the most serious crimes
were excluded from benefit of clergy because of the obvious injustice
of allowing murderers, robbers, and arsonists to escape punishment
merely because they had memorized a few lines of scripture. 249 But as
Parliament expanded the list of capital offenses in the seventeenth
through nineteenth centuries, it also started withdrawing benefit of
clergy from many less serious capital crimes. 250
As Parliament increasingly withdrew benefit of clergy, courts used
the rule of strict construction of penal statutes to limit the effect of
Parliament's actions.25' Seventeenth century jurist Matthew Hale
explained why courts did this. He wrote that statutes withdrawing
benefit of clergy should be strictly construed "in favorem vitae &
privilegii clericalis."252 Because the law favors life and disfavors the
death penalty, statutes that move the balance in favor of death should
be read narrowly. For the same reason, Hale explained, statutes
restoring benefit of clergy should be liberally construed, for such
statutes "are in materia favorabili, in case of life, and in case of a
privilege, which hath been ever favoured in law .... ,253
248 For a concise discussion of the history of benefit of clergy, see John H.
Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (1983).
249 See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 208, at 343 (discussing statute enacted during
the reign of Henry the Eighth, withdrawing benefit of clergy from those who commit
murder and various kinds of burglary, robbery and arson); see also Langbein, supra
note 248, at 38 (noting that the effect of these early exclusions was to limit benefit of
clergy to crimes relating to larceny).
250 For a description of parliamentary efforts to withdraw benefit of clergy for many
offenses, and the judicial response thereto, see Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal
Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 751 (1935) (asserting that "from
1691 to 1765 benefit of clergy was ousted in various forms of fraud, embezzlement,
and aggravated larceny" and that judges "tempered this severity with strict
construction carried to its most absurd limits"); see, e.g., Price, supra note 134, 897
(2004) (discussing how Parliament passed statutes to limit the benefit of the clergy).
251 See Price, supra note 134, at 897.
252 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 335 (London, E. and R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736).
253 Id. at 371; see, e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
STATUTORY CRIMES; INCLUDING THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN
GENERAL. WHAT IS SPECIAL TO THE CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE SPECIFIC STATUTORY
OFFENCES AS TO BOTH LAW AND PROCEDURE 189 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed.
1883) ("While the parts of a penal statute which subject to punishment or a penalty
are, from their odious nature, to be construed strictly, those which exempt from penal
consequences will, because of their opposite character, receive a liberal
interpretation." (internal footnotes omitted)).
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Writing a century later, William Blackstone demonstrated how far
courts would go to limit the effect of statutes withdrawing benefit of
clergy. In one case discussed by Blackstone, the court construed a
statute withdrawing benefit of clergy from those "convicted of stealing
horses" not to cover a defendant who stole only one horse. 254 Another
statute withdrew benefit of clergy from those convicted of stealing
sheep "or other cattle."2s5 The court concluded that the words "other
cattle" were "much too loose to create a capital offence," and therefore
"the act was held to extend to nothing but mere sheep." 256 As these
examples show, English judges did not apply the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes in a value-neutral manner. Because "the
law" favored life and disfavored capital punishment, judges restricted
statutes withdrawing benefit of clergy to the narrowest scope that
could reasonably be inferred from the text.
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes was not restricted to
capital punishment, and it was not restricted to England. The Supreme
Court of the United States first applied the rule in 1820, in a non-
capital manslaughter case.25 7 In America, as in England, the rule of
strict construction of penal statutes was intended primarily to limit the
effect of statutes that expanded the scope or harshness of criminal
punishment. Joel Prentiss Bishop explained that "Itihe law delights in
the life, liberty, and happiness of the subject; consequently it deems
statutes which deprive him of these, or his property, however
necessary they may be, in a sense odious."258 Such statutes were to be
strictly construed. Statutes that reduced the scope or severity of
criminal laws, on the other hand, were a "delight" to the law and were
to be liberally construed. 25 9 Because the key purpose of the rule of
strict construction of penal statutes was to limit the harshness of new
penal statutes, the "degree of strictness" a judge should employ "will
depend somewhat on the severity of the punishment" it inflicts.260
254 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at *88.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
258 BISHOP, supra note 253, at 185 (internal footnotes omitted).
259 See id. at 184 ("To things odious, is applied the strict interpretation; to things
favored, the liberal: as a father, in chastising his child, would keep within the necessity
of the case to the letter; while, in bestowing a merited reward, he would cast in
something also from affection.").
260 Id. at 186; see, e.g., J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS
RELATIVE TO THE FORMS OF LEGISLATION AND TO LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE TOGETHER WITH
AN EXPOSITION AT LENGTH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND COGNATE TOPICS
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Neither Hale nor Bishop saw the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes as a form of judicial activism or defiance of legislative will.
Bishop described the rule as flowing from the judge's duty to follow
the preferences of "the law" in situations where a penal statute
threatened to deviate from those preferences. For example, he asserted
that "the courts should and do give a strict construction to statutes
which inflict capital punishments" because "[tihe law ... is watchful
over human life, and careful to avoid the taking of it away." 261 Bishop
stressed that judges are under a duty to follow this rule even where
they personally prefer a broad interpretation of a death penalty statute:
"A judge, as a man, may be of the same mind with the law, or he may
not; but, in his judicial capacity, he is required to preserve, as far as he
may, the lives of the people." 262
When treatise writers of the seventeenth through nineteenth
centuries talked about "the law's" preference for life and liberty, they
were talking about fundamental principles of the common law. Hale
asserted that the rule of strict construction of penal statutes was
supported by the common law maxim "in favorem vitae." 263 Hawkins
described the "nemo debet bis puniri" principle as "a Maxim made in
favour of Life." 264 Bishop supported his claim that the law delights in
the "life, liberty and happiness of the subject" with citations to
common law precedents and treatises.265 When Hale, Bishop, and
other legal thinkers of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries
talked about the preferences of "the law," they were talking about the
common law.
The common law connected the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes to basic principles of justice. Since the common law's
preference for life and liberty reflected the natural law, and since the
legislature could be presumed to intend that its penal statutes comport
with that preference, a judge could appropriately use strict
construction to limit the scope and harshness of a new penal statute,
436 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1891) ("Strict construction is not a precise but a
relative expression; it varies in degree of strictness according to the character of the
law under construction. The construction will be more or less strict according to the
gravity of the consequences flowing from the operation of the statute or its infraction;
if penal, the severity of the penalty; if in derogation of common right, or capable of
being employed oppressively, the extent and nature of the innovation and the
consequences." (internal footnotes omitted)).
261 BISHOP, supra note 253, at 179.
262 Id.
263 2 HALE, supra note 252, at 335.
264 2 HAWKINS, supra note 208, at 370.
265 BISHOP, supra note 253, at 185.
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particularly when it tended toward authorization of punishment that
was excessive in light of prior usage.266 In the United States, the idea
that "the law" preferred life, liberty, and happiness was further
supported by the references to these concepts in the Declaration of
Independence 267 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due
Process Clauses. 268
B. Preventing Division and Excess
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, defendants challenged
prosecutorial efforts to divide crime and impose multiple punishments
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double
Jeopardy Clause, and especially the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes. Across all three areas of doctrine, judges responded to these
challenges by asking: (1) Does this unit of prosecution give the
government the opportunity to bring multiple charges based on a
single course of conduct?; and (2) If so, would the bringing of
multiple charges create an arbitrary relationship between the
offender's culpability and his cumulative punishment? If the proposed
unit of prosecution differed from prior practice in a manner that
permitted multiple charges and arbitrary and excessive punishments,
judges declared the unit of prosecution unlawful.
1. Stacking and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
In the nineteenth century, laws regulating the sale of alcoholic
beverages were a repeated source of controversy relating to division
and excess. Although these cases were often resolved using statutory
construction,269 two cases that reached the Supreme Court of the
United States shed an interesting light on the relationship between
266 See Helmholz, supra note 243, at 339.
267 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.").
268 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[Nior shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
269 See, e.g., Washburn v. M'lnroy, 7 Johns. 134, 136-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810)
(interpreting statute to permit imposition of only one penalty for unlawful liquor sales,
despite fact that defendant had sold liquor on numerous occasions); State v. Nutt, 28
Vt. 598, 602 (1856) (construing statute to prohibit government from using defendant's
unlawful liquor sales to obtain separate convictions against defendant for being a
"common seller" of alcohol and for engaging in multiple unlawful liquor sales).
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division, stacking, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
These cases were Pervear v. Massachusetts270 and O'Neil v. Vermont. 271
Pervear was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited
maintenance of an unlicensed "tenement for the illegal sale and illegal
keeping of intoxicating liquors." He was fined $50 and sentenced to
three months' imprisonment at hard labor.272 Pervear argued that his
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. 273 The Supreme Court refused to decide this
issue on the ground that the Amendment did not apply to the states.
Nonetheless, the Court opined in dicta that the punishment did not
raise serious Eighth Amendment concerns. It was within the state's
police power "to protect the community against the manifold evils of
intemperance" by "prohibiting under penalties the sale and keeping
for sale of intoxicating liquors [] without license. '" 274 Since the
penalties imposed in this case were relatively light, the Court
concluded that "[w] e perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual"
in the sentence.275
Twenty-six years later the Supreme Court heard O'Neil v.
Vermont, 276 another case involving unlicensed liquor sales. Whereas
Pervear was convicted of maintaining an illegal "tenement" for the sale
of liquor, O'Neil was charged under a statute that made it a crime to
"sell, furnish, and give away intoxicating liquor, without authority." 277
The difference in statutory wording led prosecutors to use a different
unit of prosecution. Whereas Pervear had been convicted of a single
count of operating an illegal business, O'Neil was convicted of three
hundred and seven counts of illegal liquor sales. 278 The difference in
unit of prosecution made an enormous difference in the sentence
imposed. Pervear was fined $50 and sentenced to three months
imprisonment. O'Neil was fined $6,140,279 and because he could not
pay he was ultimately sentenced to fifty-four and one-half years
imprisonment. 280 Even though O'Neil's conduct appears to have been
270 Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866).
271 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
272 Pervear, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 480.
273 Id. at 479.
274 Id. at 480.
275 Id.
276 O'Neil, 144 U.S. 323.
277 Id. at 325.
278 Id. at 327.
279 Id. at 330.
280 Id. at 330-31. The prison sentence was imposed pursuant to a Vermont statute
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virtually identical to Pervear's, his fine was more than one hundred
and twenty-two times the size of Pervear's, and his prison sentence
was two hundred and eighteen times as long.
As in Pervear, the Supreme Court refused to decide the merits of
O'Neil's Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the states.28' Three justices dissented, led
by Justice Stephen Field. Justice Field argued that Vermont's decision
to divide O'Neil's course of conduct into numerous discrete offenses
and punish each separately was cruel and unusual. Although the state
has the power to punish a person for "the drinking of one drop of
liquor," he asserted, it would be an "unheard-of cruelty" to "count the
drops in a single glass, and make thereby a thousand offences," thus
imposing a life sentence "for drinking the single glass of liquor."282
This mode of punishing O'Neil's conduct was cruel and unusual
because division and stacking created an arbitrary relationship
between O'Neil's culpability and his punishment. Selling liquor
without a license was a relatively minor offense, whether one focused
on the overall retail operation or the various individual sales. By
dividing O'Neil's course of conduct into numerous individual acts and
then stacking them on top of each other at sentencing, the government
was able to punish a misdemeanor as harshly as the most serious
felony. This was impermissible, Justice Field argued. Although the
government has the authority to punish a petty offense with twenty
lashes, a judge could not lawfully order that a person who has
committed one hundred petty offenses "be scourged until the flesh fall
from his body."283 Justice Field's conclusion was supported by the fact
that the punishment was much harsher than prior practice would
permit for similar conduct. In Justice Fields' words, the punishment
"exceed[s] in severity.., anything which I have been able to find in
the records of our courts for the present century."284
2. Division and Double Jeopardy
Another repeated source of controversy relating to division and
stacking was the federal effort to suppress Mormon polygamy. The
Supreme Court heard two cases arising from prosecutorial efforts to
that called for three days of imprisonment for every dollar of a defaulted criminal fine.
281 Id. at 331-32.
282 Id. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 340, 364.
284 Id. at 338.
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prosecute a defendant multiple times for a single, ongoing polygamous
cohabitation.
In the first case, Ex parte Snow,285 the defendant was charged with
three violations of the federal anti-polygamy statute, which stated that
any man who "cohabits with more than one woman... shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars, or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court."286 One indictment
charged that he lived with seven women throughout 1883.287 Another
charged that he lived with the same seven women throughout 1884.288
A third charged that he lived with the same women throughout
1885.289 The only difference between these indictments was that "each
covered a different period of time." 290 Snow was convicted of all three
violations, and was given three consecutive sentences of six months
imprisonment, and three fines of $300 each.291 Snow ultimately filed a
petition for habeas corpus on the ground that "'the [district] court had
no jurisdiction to pass judgment' against him 'upon more than one of
the indictments ... [because] the offense therein set out is the same as
that contained ... in each of the other ... indictments ...."'292
Therefore "the maximum punishment which the court had authority
to impose was six months' imprisonment and a fine of three hundred
dollars ...."293
The Supreme Court ordered the district court to grant Snow's writ
of habeas corpus, holding that "[tihe offense of cohabitation, in the
sense of this statute ... is, inherently, a continuous offense, having
duration; and not an offense consisting of an isolated act." 294 Because
cohabitation is inherently a continuing offense, prosecutors were not
permitted to divide it up into distinct time units and obtain multiple
punishments.
The result in Snow is defensible from a positivist and textualist
viewpoint. The term "cohabit" does seem to imply some kind of
285 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
286 Id. at 275-76.
287 Id. at 276.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 278-79.
292 Id. at 280.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 281.
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duration, and it makes sense conceptually to treat this crime as an
ongoing one. But the Snow court did not focus on the text of the
statute. It focused, rather, on the fact that the government's proposed
unit of prosecution would allow the government to bring a limitless
number of charges against Snow and impose a cumulative punishment
that was arbitrary and cruel. If the government were permitted to
divide Snow's cohabitation into three one-year periods, then:
On the same principle there might have been an indictment
covering each of the 35 months, with imprisonment for 17 1/2
years and fines amounting to $10,500, or even an indictment
covering every week, with imprisonment for 74 years and fines
amounting to $44,400; and so on, ad infinitum, for smaller
periods of time.29-
Any division of this course of conduct, which encompassed a lengthy
time period and involved many individual acts that might be
characterized as "cohabitation," would be arbitrary and would permit
excessive punishment. For this reason, "a continuing offense of the
character of the one in this case can be committed but once, for the
purposes of indictment or prosecution, prior to the time the
prosecution is instituted. ' 296
The Supreme Court did not cite the Double Jeopardy Clause in Ex
parte Snow. Although the Court said it was impermissible to punish
the same offense twice, this opinion may have been based upon either
the Double Jeopardy Clause or statutory construction. Two years later,
in Ex parte Nielsen,297 the Supreme Court made the connection
between division and Double Jeopardy explicit. Nielsen, like Snow,
arose from federal efforts to stamp out Mormon polygamy. Hans
Nielsen lived with two women, Anna Lavinia Nielsen and Caroline
Nielsen. 298 The first indictment charged Nielsen with unlawful
cohabitation with both women October 15, 1885, to May 13, 1888.299
The second indictment charged that Nielsen engaged in adultery with
Caroline Nielsen on May 14, 1888.300 Nielsen pled guilty to the first
offense and was sentenced to three months imprisonment and a one
hundred dollar fine. 301 After completing this sentence, Nielsen was
295 Id. at 282.
296 Id.
297 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
298 Id. at 177.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
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brought to trial on the adultery charge. He attacked the indictment
with a plea of prior conviction, arguing that adultery was a lesser-
included offense of cohabitation. 302 The court denied his plea,
convicted him of adultery, and sentenced him to an additional one
hundred and twenty-five days in prison.303
Like Snow, Nielsen petitioned for habeas corpus and the Supreme
Court ordered that the petition be granted. 304 The Court held that
adultery was, indeed, a lesser-included offense to unlawful
cohabitation, and therefore the effort to divide the time period in
which Nielson engaged in polygamy in order to obtain two
punishments was unlawful. 305 The Nielsen court quoted Snow's
assertion that permitting division of the offense would unjustly allow
prosecutors to pile up limitless punishments against the defendant.306
Thus the prosecutors' efforts to divide Nielsen's crime into distinct
time periods in order to obtain multiple punishments violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.307
3. Division, Stacking, and the Rule of Strict Construction of Penal
Statutes
Most eighteenth and nineteenth century cases raising questions
about division and stacking were resolved under the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes. This rule was much stronger than the
current rule of lenity because it reflected a systemic bias against
overpunishment.3 8 Common law writers from Hale to Bishop argued
that the rule of strict construction was based upon "the law's"
preference for life and liberty over death and imprisonment. 309 "The
law" to which these writers referred was the natural law as reflected in
longstanding common law practice. 310 Because the legislature could be
presumed to wish that new penal statutes comply with basic principles
of justice, it was the duty of courts to narrowly construe penal statutes
that expanded the scope or severity of criminal law.31' This was a
302 Id. at 177-78.
303 Id. at 178.
304 Id. at 176, 190-91.
305 Id. at 187.
306 Id. at 186.
307 Id. at 188.
308 See supra Part II.A.4.
309 See supra Part II.A.4.
310 See supra Part II.A.4.
311 See supra Part II.A.4.
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powerful justification for a rule of strict construction, and explains
why the rule played a more important role in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries than the rule of lenity does today.
Eighteenth and nineteenth century courts used the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes to prevent division and stacking in
situations where the government's proposed unit of prosecution
created a substantial risk of excessive punishment. The two most
important factors in this analysis were the likelihood that the
proposed unit of prosecution would enable the government to seek
numerous punishments for a single course of conduct, and the
resulting arbitrary relationship between the offender's culpability and
his cumulative punishment.
The oft-cited English case Crepps v. Durden312 demonstrates the role
arbitrariness played in courts' analysis of the division question. Crepps
was a baker who was convicted of four violations of a statute
prohibiting a person from "exercising his ordinary calling on a
Sunday" because he sold four "small hot loaves of bread" on the
prohibited day. 313 Lord Mansfield held that Crepps could only be
punished once for working as a baker on a Sunday, however many
individual acts of baking or selling he may have undertaken that day.
He held that the "object" of the act was not to punish "repeated
offenses," but to prohibit a unitary course of conduct.314 Lord
Mansfield reached this conclusion, in part, because the government's
proposed unit of prosecution would make the relationship between
the defendant's punishment and his culpability wholly arbitrary. It
would be absurd to conclude that "if a taylor sews on the Lord's day,
every stitch he takes is a separate offence; or, if a shoe-maker or
carpenter work for different customers at different times on the same
Sunday, that those are so many separate and distinct offences." 315
Because it could be presumed that the legislature did not intend this
statute to authorize arbitrary units of prosecution, the narrower
reading was required.
Nineteenth century courts recognized that division of the unit of
prosecution created a risk of excessive as well as arbitrary punishment.
For example, Mayor v. Ordrenan316 involved a state statute that
empowered the City of New York to make ordinances designed to
encourage safe handling and storage of gunpowder, and to impose a
312 (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.).
313 Id. at 1283-84.
314 Id. at 1287.
315 Id.
316 12Johns. 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815).
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penalty for violation of one of these ordinances "not exceeding 250
dollars."317 Pursuant to this statute, New York City passed an
ordinance making it illegal to store more than twenty-eight pounds of
gunpowder in one place, and imposing a fine of $125 for every
hundred weight of gunpowder stored in excess of the limit.318 The city
charged Ordrenan with keeping 1,100 pounds of gunpowder in one
place at one time, and sought a fine of $1,375 from him. 31 9 The city's
theory of the case was that each hundred weight over the limit
constituted a separate offense and justified a separate fine.320 The
Supreme Court of New York held that the ordinance under which this
prosecution was brought exceeded the city's power under the relevant
state statute. The court strictly construed the state statute to permit a
maximum fine of $250 for "any one transaction" involving
gunpowder. 321 If the statute were construed to permit the city to
define more than one offense per transaction, "the limitation in the
amount of the penalty would be nugatory."322 In this case, the city
chose to impose a penalty of $125 for every hundred weight of
gunpowder kept in violation of the ordinance, but "[tihere is no limit
to the principle set up in the [ordinance]. With the same propriety,
the penalty of $125 might have been imposed on every pound of
gunpowder, or even on every grain, kept contrary to the
[ordinance]. "323 Because a broader construction of the state statute
would authorize the City of New York to divide the underlying offense
and impose arbitrary and excessive punishments, the court chose the
narrower interpretation.
Similarly, in State v. Commissioners of Fayetteville,324 the defendants
were under a statutory duty to keep the streets of Fayetteville in good
repair. 325 When the streets were inspected, "[t]hree or four streets"
were found to be "out of repair at the same time."326 Prosecutors
charged the defendants under a separate indictment for each street
found to be out of repair.327 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
317 Id. at 122.
318 Id. at 122-23.
319 Id. at 123.
320 See id. at 124.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 371 (1818).
325 Id. at 371.
326 Id.
327 Id.
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strictly construed the statute under which the defendants were
prosecuted to allow only one charge for neglect of duty, regardless of
how many streets were out of repair.328 The court did not engage in
detailed textual analysis - in fact, it did not directly quote the statute
at all. Instead, it focused on the fact that allowing multiple
prosecutions in cases like this would lead to excessive punishments:
It would be monstrous to charge them with separate
indictments for every street in the town, when the whole were
out of repair at the same time; especially when upon one
indictment a fine can be imposed adequate to the real estimate
of the offence. Were such a doctrine tolerated, it is impossible
to say where its consequences would end; for then an overseer
whose road is out of repair might be charged in separate
indictments, for every hundred yards, (why not every yard?)
and be ruined by the costs, when perhaps a moderate fine
would atone for the offence.329
The court concluded by noting that prosecutorial efforts to divide
crime are inherently unjust: "This notion of rendering crimes, like
matter infinitely divisible, is repugnant to the spirit and policy of the
law and ought not to be countenanced." 330
Concerns about arbitrariness and excess led nineteenth century
courts to interpret criminal statutes to prohibit prosecutors from
bringing multiple charges and seeking multiple punishments even
where the most plausible reading of the statutory text would seem to
permit multiple charges and punishments. For example, in United
States v. New York Guaranty & Indemnity Co., 331 prosecutors charged
the defendant, a bank, with numerous violations of a statute that
required the bank to file a separate tax return every month and
imposed a $200 fine for "any refusal or neglect" to meet this
requirement. 332 Because the bank had failed to file such a return
between November 1865 and August 1872, 333 the government argued
that it had "refused or neglected" its duty on more than ninety
separate occasions and was subject to a fine of more than $18,000. The
court rejected the government's reading of the statute. Instead, it read
"any refusal or neglect" to mean "all refusals or neglects": "The
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 371-72.
331 27 F. Cas. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1875).
332 Id.
333 Id.
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penalty is not imposed for each and every refusal or neglect, but for
any refusal or neglect." 334 Thus the statute imposed "only one penalty
of $200 for all neglects or defaults prior to the commencement of the
suit."335 Although the government reading of the statute was textually
plausible - arguably more plausible than the reading adopted by the
court - the court rejected it because it would lead to an arbitrary and
excessive punishment.
11. How DID WE GET HERE AND WHERE ARE WE HEADING?
This Part provides a tentative sketch of our movement from
protective moral realism to empty positivism. It also discusses some
ways in which we can recover protections against arbitrary and
excessive punishment even if we do not share all of the metaphysical
assumptions on which the older approach was based.
A. Instrumentalism and Division
The foregoing discussion shows that the Supreme Court's approach
to cruel and unusual punishments, double jeopardy, and the rule of
strict construction of penal statutes has been dramatically transformed
since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause originally forbade new punishment practices that
were excessive in relationship to the offender's culpability as measured
against longstanding punishment practice. 336 Today, the Court holds
that legislatures are not required to base punishment on culpability,
and are free to decide how much punishment is justified under their
chosen rationale. 337 The Double Jeopardy Clause was originally
supposed to prevent the risk of multiple punishments for the same
offense. 338 The Court now holds that legislatures are utterly free to
impose multiple punishments for the same offense if they wish to do
so. 339 The rule of strict construction of penal statutes originally
directed courts to limit the effect of criminal statutes that increased the
scope or severity of criminal punishment, on the theory that the
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 See supra Part II.A.2; see also Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note
11, at 961-78.
337 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27-28 (2003) (plurality opinion);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004 (1991); see also supra Part I.B.1.
338 See supra Part II.A.3.
339 See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
169 n.8 (1977); see also supra Part II.C.
2010 [Vol. 48:1955
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments
legislature would not intend the statute to impose punishments that
were unjust in light of longstanding prior practice. 340 Over the past
century, the rule of strict construction has been transformed into the
rule of lenity, which is weak and has little theoretical justification.341
The Supreme Court has emptied all three doctrines of substance and
made them mere instruments for effectuating legislative will. Because
of these changes, challenges to the division of crimes and
multiplication of punishments are now almost certain to fail.
The transformation of these doctrines reflects at least two major
changes in legal philosophy over the past century: The rejection of
moral realism in favor of legal positivism, and the rejection of
common law tradition in favor of legislative innovation.342 Both
changes were closely associated with a movement that is sometimes
called instrumentalism. 343 Instrumentalism holds that law is nothing
more than an instrument for effectuating whatever policies the
dominant group in society considers preferable.344 Constraints based
on morality and tradition are, on this view, nothing more than
impediments to progress. Instrumentalism was and is a powerful force
in American jurisprudence, and is at least partly responsible for the
changes in doctrine described above. 345 There were many other
reasons for the change - history is complex and many factors
contribute to its development. 346 But at a minimum, instrumentalism's
success in breaking the bond between law, morality and tradition left
courts with fewer tools for countering the legislative and prosecutorial
tendency toward excessive punishment. 347 This Part describes some of
the ways these tools were removed, but far more work needs to be
done to paint a complete picture.348
1. The Instrumentalist Revolution
The movement from protective moral realism to empty positivism
was caused, in large part, by the instrumentalist revolution of the first
half of the twentieth century. Society changed quite a lot in the
340 See supra Part IL.A.4.
341 See supra Part I.C.
342 See supra Part II.A.1.
343 See supra Part II.A.1.
344 See supra Part II.A.1.
345 See supra Part II.A.1.
346 See supra Part II.A.1.
347 See supra Part ILA.1.
348 See supra Part II.A.1.
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decades between the Civil War 349 and the New Deal. The population
exploded, science advanced, the economy grew, and people moved
from country to city and often ended up working for large, impersonal
industrial concerns.350 At the same time, moral skepticism was on the
rise, fueled by the writings of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spenser,
among others.351 Many legal thinkers in the early twentieth century
considered the old common law system hopelessly antiquated, based
upon outdated ideas of morality and social organization. 352
The instrumentalist attack on the common law was presaged by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s influential law review article, The Path of
the Law. 353 In this article, Holmes famously announced that he wished
to eliminate "every word of moral significance" 354 from the law and to
make the role of history and tradition "very small."355 Law itself was,
in Holmes' view, simply "the preference of a given body in a given
time and place," 356 resulting from a "concealed, half conscious battle"
among competing interests.357 Since the law was simply the product of
political struggle, it had no predetermined ends, no built-in
"delight"358 in life, liberty, and happiness. Instead, whoever controlled
the law chose the "ends sought to be attained," 359 and could use the
349 See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 41-51 (2000) (discussing the possible effect of the Civil War in fostering
Holmes' moral skepticism); LOuis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 69 (2001).
350 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253-54 (1952) (attributing
the rise of strict liability offenses to the need for regulation arising from an
increasingly complex society); Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 68 (1933) ("[T]he growing complexities of twentieth century life have
demanded an increasing social regulation; and for this purpose the existing machinery
of the criminal law has been seized upon and utilized."); Harlan F. Stone, The Common
Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1936) ("Science, invention and
industrial expansion have done more than all else to change the habits of life of the
people of this continent, and the striking development in those fields has taken place
since the Civil War.").
351 See, e.g., ALSCHULER, supra note 349, at 9, 49 (describing the rise of moral
skepticism); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF
LAw 38-39 (2006).
352 See, e.g., Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916)
(discussing the perceived inadequacy of the common law to deal with the complex
problems of modern society).
353 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
354 Id. at 464.
355 Id. at 474.
356 See id. at 466.
357 See id.
358 See BISHOP, supra note 253, at 185.
359 Id. at 474.
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power of "statistics" and "economics" to determine the most efficient
way to reach whatever ends those might be.360
The idea that the law is indistinguishable from politics and that the
role of judges is to effectuate the will of the victor was greatly
influential in the early decades of the twentieth century. John Dewey,
for example, wrote that law is "coercion" whose only inherent value is
"efficiency. ' 361 Roscoe Pound described law as "social engineering. '" 362
The basic idea underlying instrumentalist writing was that law should
operate as a tool for solving social problems. Judges should not
construe statutes narrowly in compliance with traditional common
law doctrine, but should construe them broadly to effectuate
legislative problem-solving. 363
This new mode of reasoning was used to uphold the New Deal and
the administrative state, and for this reason it is often celebrated in the
legal academy today.364 Instrumentalism's legacy for criminal offenders
is not discussed as often, perhaps because it is considerably darker.
One of the traditional moral ideas Holmes attacked in The Path of the
Law was that criminal punishment should be based upon, and limited
by, the offender's moral culpability. Holmes argued that criminal law
should focus on "the dangerousness of the criminal," not his
culpability.365 According to Holmes, "well known men of science"
believed that "the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or
to murder by as deep seated an organic necessity as that which makes
the rattlesnake bite." 366 If the scientists were right - and Holmes
360 Id. at 469.
361 SeeJohn Dewey, Force and Coercion, 26 INT'LJ. OF ETHICS 359, 366 (1916).
362 See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 195 (1921).
363 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 407
(1908) ("The public cannot be relied upon permanently to tolerate judicial
obstruction or nullification of the social policies to which more and more it is
compelled to be committed.").
364 See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 227 (1976) (discussing connection between instrumentalism and
the New Deal-era); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 284
(1989) ("[L]iberal legalism is an inchoate and largely unarticulated concept, but in its
essence it fused the social reformist impulse of Progressivism, the relativism and
instrumentalism of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, and the regulatory
responsibility of the state associated with the New Deal."); Daniel R. Williams, After
the Gold Rush - Part II: Hamdi, the Jury Trial, and Our Degraded Public Sphere, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 55, 90 n.149 (2008) ("New Deal liberals, in fact, are perfect
exemplars of the instrumentalist orientation, committed as they are to the idea that
reason can produce a form of social engineering that leads to greater social justice.").
365 See Holmes, supra note 353, at 470-71.
366 See id. at 470.
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seemed to think they were - then criminals must be treated like
rattlesnakes and "got rid of."367
Holmes' idea that criminal law should focus on social control rather
than culpability gained great currency in the first half of the twentieth
century. For example, Sheldon Glueck wrote that in formulating
criminal laws, "[s] ociety should utilize every scientific instrumentality
for self-protection against destructive elements in its midst," and that
"[nlo thoughtful person today seriously holds th[eI theory" that
punishment should be based on moral culpability. 368 Livingston Hall
wrote: "Clearly retribution should have little part in determining
present-day principles of criminal law."369 Justice Stone wrote that the
legal system of the twentieth century was "founded upon the idea, new
to English law, that the basis of liability is not the fault of a
wrongdoer, but such method of distributing the burden of loss as
accepted social policy dictates." 370
The move from a culpability-based idea of criminal law to a focus on
social danger and social control implied that at least some common
law rights could no longer be justified. John Dewey wrote that rights
were justifiable only to the extent they promoted "efficiency." 37' John
Barker Waite wrote even more pointedly:
[I]f once the whole idea of punishment be discarded and the
objective of every prosecution be recognized as the removal of
a particular social danger ... quibble, casuistry, technicality in
the fabrication of 'rights', will no longer seem legitimate
defenses in a contest, but must appear in their true character
as obstacles to the progress of social prophylaxis. 372
In sum, instrumentalists argued that traditional rights of criminal
defendants that impeded governmental efforts at social control should
be modified or eliminated.
A major example of the Supreme Court's move toward
instrumentalism was its acceptance of strict liability crimes starting in
the 1920s. Traditionally, a person could not be convicted of crime
without proof that he acted in a morally culpable manner.373 The mens
367 See id.
368 Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 455,
456 (1928).
369 Hall, supra note 250, at 759 n.56.
370 Stone, supra note 350, at 4.
371 See Dewey, supra note 361, at 366.
372 JOHN BARKER WAITE, CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION 320 (1934).
373 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 182, at *28 ("[Plunishments are... only inflicted
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rea requirement was a universally accepted part of criminal law, and
was considered so fundamental that the Supreme Court asserted in
1877: "All punitive legislation contemplates some relation between
guilt and punishment. To inflict the latter where the former does not
exist would shock the sense of justice of every one."374 By 1922,
however, the Court held that there was no need to prove mens rea
where the "emphasis of the statute is ... upon achievement of some
social betterment." 375 By 1943, the Court implied that a mens rea
requirement was actually disfavored because it was an obstacle to
making the criminal law "a working instrument of government."37 6
Neither the rule of strict construction of penal statutes, nor the
Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition of multiple punishments for the
same offense, nor the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause's
prohibition of excessive punishments makes much sense in an
instrumentalist legal universe. If the criminal law does not have any
predetermined ends - if it does not "delight" in life and liberty and
does not insist that punishment reflect an offender's desert - the
limitations imposed by these doctrines look like more like
obstructions than protections. Phrased differently, if the point of
criminal law is to enhance government's power to eliminate social
dangers, courts should look for ways to cooperate in this effort, not
constrain it.
2. Instrumentalism and the Rule of Strict Construction of Penal
Statutes
During the first half of the twentieth century, instrumentalists
attacked the rule of strict construction of penal statutes on the ground
that it impeded progress by tying new penal statutes to outmoded
common law standards. John Barker Waite described the rule as a
"policy... to utilize casuistic plausibility or any dubiety of the situation
for the benefit of the accused rather than for the immediate safety of
society."377 Roscoe Pound wrote that "the disinclination of courts and
lawyers to give to penal statutes any wider application than the letter
for the abuse of... free will ...."); id. at *20 ("[Ain unwarrantable act without a
vicious will is no crime at all.").
374 Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877).
375 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
376 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
377 WAITE, supra note 372, at 16.
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required" made it unduly difficult for legislatures "to make
improvements in the definition of old crimes."378 Livingston Hall wrote:
Changing conditions of modern civilization, and the growth of
scientific knowledge on criminology, render imperative a new
approach to the problems of crime. New categories of crimes
and criminals cannot always be accurately defined on the first
attempt. Shall the new machinery be nullified from the start
under the guise of 'strict construction', or shall it be carried
out liberally in the spirit in which it is conceived? Merely to
state the issue is to answer it .... [T]here is no sound reason
for a general doctrine of strict construction of penal statutes,
and prima facie all such should have as liberal a construction
as statutes generally.379
The Supreme Court's embrace of instrumentalism led it to
deemphasize the rule of strict construction of penal statutes early in
the twentieth century. This move caused a drastic change in the way
the Supreme Court handled prosecutorial efforts to divide crime and
impose multiple punishments. Ebeling v. Morgan,380 for example,
involved a defendant who entered a railway postal car and cut open six
mail bags, apparently with the intent to steal some of their contents.
Ebeling was convicted of six violations of Section 189 of the Federal
Criminal Code, which provided: "Whoever shall tear, cut, or
otherwise injure any mail bag.., with intent to rob or steal any such
mail, or to render the same insecure, shall be fined not more than five
hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."381
The district judge sentenced Ebeling to the maximum prison term on
each count, and ordered that five of these terms should be served
consecutively. 382 Thus, his total prison sentence was fifteen years.383
Ebeling petitioned for habeas corpus on the ground that he had
committed only one offense and therefore his maximum punishment
should be three years imprisonment. 384
Under the reasoning of the nineteenth century cases discussed in
Part 1IB, Ebeling had a strong argument that the unit of prosecution
under this statute should be his single theft attempt, not the multiple
378 ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 143-44 (1930).
379 Hall, supra note 250, at 761, 762.
380 Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
381 Id. at 629.
382 Id. at 628.
383 Id.
384 See id.
2016 [Vol. 48:1955
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments
acts of cutting he performed in the course of this attempt. Ebeling
entered a single train car with the intent to steal mail from a single
victim, and he opened six bags in furtherance of this intent. Under
traditional standards, he was guilty of a single count of attempted
theft. If the unit of prosecution were divided to make each act of
cutting done in furtherance of this theft a separate offense, the
relationship between Ebeling's culpability and his punishment would
become arbitrary, and he would be subjected to a grave risk of
excessive punishment. A would-be thief who cut open one bag in an
unsuccessful effort to steal mail could be given no more than a three-
year sentence. If the same person cut open five bags, he could get
fifteen years. If he cut open ten bags, he could get thirty years. A
person who cuts open ten mail bags on a single occasion without
successfully stealing anything might be somewhat more culpable than
a person who cuts open only one mail bag, but the difference between
them would not be enough to justify a ten-fold increase in sentence
under traditional standards. Under the rule of strict construction of
penal statutes, the Court could presume that Congress would not have
intended the statute to expand criminal liability in such a dramatically
unjust manner. 385
The Supreme Court in Ebeling did not consider the problems of
arbitrariness and excess raised by the government's proposed unit of
prosecution. Instead, the Court focused on the statutory language that
prohibited the cutting of "any bag."386 Based on this language, and this
language alone, the Court held that "it was the intention of the
lawmakers to protect each and every mail bag from felonious injury
and mutilation. Whenever any one mail bag is thus torn, cut, or
injured, the offense is complete." 387 The Court distinguished Ebeling's
case from Crepps v. Durden and Ex parte Snow on the ground that
385 In fact, the statute's use of the phrase "any mail bag" was probably the result of
Congress's need to include an element establishing the federal government's
jurisdiction to punish attempted theft like Ebeling's. One of the curious features of
federal criminal statutes is that they are often worded in such a way that the
jurisdictional element misleadingly appears to be the heart of the offense. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (penalizing anyone who "having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for
mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service"); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (penalizing anyone who "obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by
robbery or extortion").
386 Ebeling, 237 U.S. at 629.
387 Id.
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those cases involved "attempts to cut up a continuous offense into
separate crimes in a manner unwarranted by the statute making the
offense punishable."388
The Supreme Court apparently considered the government's effort
to divide Ebeling's attempted theft into six separate offenses to be
warranted by the fact that the statute used the phrase "any bag,"
whereas the statutes in Crepps and Snow did not use similarly
atomistic language. The Court's conclusion regarding the effect of the
word "any" was far from inescapable, however. In fact, nineteenth
century courts sometimes interpreted the word "any" in a statute to
preclude division of crime, where division would lead to arbitrary and
excessive punishment. For example, in New York Guaranty &
Indemnity, discussed above, the court interpreted statutory language
punishing "any refusal or neglect" to file a tax return as creating a
single offense that covered all acts of refusal and neglect prior to the
bringing of the indictment. 389 The contrast between New York
Guaranty & Indemnity and Ebeling demonstrates that the assumptions
the court brings to bear in interpreting a penal statute will often
determine whether the court finds an ambiguity calling for application
of the rule of strict construction. The New York Guaranty & Indemnity
Court started with the assumption that penal statutes should be
strictly construed to prevent overpunishment, and so it interpreted the
word "any" to restrict the number of penalties the government could
seek for a given course of conduct. The Ebeling court started with no
apparent concern about the effect its ruling would have on the
government's ability to bring multiple charges and obtain multiple
punishments for conduct that had traditionally been treated as a single
offense. It therefore interpreted the word "any" to permit - and even
encourage - division of crimes and multiplication of punishments.
As Mila Sohoni390 and Lawrence Solan 391 have shown, the
transformation of the rule of strict construction of criminal statutes
into the weak rule of lenity was largely completed by the middle of the
twentieth century. Led by Justice Frankfurter, 392 the Court used
instrumentalist reasoning to take a canon of construction that was
historically "hostile toward the legislative process itself" and designed
"to restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible
388 See id. at 629-30.
389 See United States v. N.Y. Guar. & Indem. Co., 27 F. Cas. 133, 133 (S.D.N.Y 1875).
390 See Sohoni, supra note 132, at 1203-06.
391 See Solan, supra note 124, at 104.
392 See id.
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compass" 393 into a rule that gives broad compass to legislative efforts
to use criminal law to solve social problems. Justice Frankfurter
described the change in the following way: "The rule comes into
operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has
expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being
lenient to wrongdoers. That is not the function of the judiciary." 394
3. Instrumentalism and Double Jeopardy
Instrumentalism also led the Supreme Court to strip the Double
Jeopardy Clause of much of its capacity to prevent multiple
punishments for a single course of conduct. As the twentieth century
progressed, legislatures increasingly enacted penal statutes that
overlapped with each other almost completely, giving the government
the opportunity to prosecute a defendant under multiple statutes for
the same criminal act.395 Defendants now faced a significant risk of
two different types of division and stacking: temporal and statutory.
Prosecutors who wished to increase an offender's punishment could
not only divide a single course of conduct into multiple temporal
units, but could also prosecute that conduct under multiple
overlapping statutes.
Both types of threat became reality in the landmark case of
Blockburger v. United States.396 In Blockburger, a government informant
working under the direction of a federal agent asked the defendant for
two dollars' worth of morphine.397 Blockburger obtained the morphine
and brought it to her.398 She then asked for an additional eight dollars'
worth of morphine, and Blockburger obtained this for her as well.399
She then asked for ten dollars' worth of morphine, and Blockburger
brought it to her.400 When she requested still more morphine,
393 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943).
394 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961); Solan, supra note 124,
at 104.
395 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) ("[F]ederal and state codes alike are filled with overlapping
crimes, such that a single criminal incident typically violates a half dozen or more
prohibitions.").
396 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
397 Blockburger v. United States, 50 F.2d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 1931) (Alschuler, J.,
dissenting).
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Id.
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Blockburger said he could not get any more.40 1 These sales all
occurred within a single twenty-four hour period.402
Prosecutors brought a five-count indictment against Blockburger 403
that arguably contained both temporal and statutory divisions. First, it
temporally divided Blockburger's course of conduct in selling
morphine to the informant into a separate offense for each drug
transaction. Second, it statutorily divided Blockburger's conduct by
charging some of his transactions under two separate provisions of the
Harrison Narcotic Act, one of which forbade the sale of morphine not
in the original stamped package, and the other of which forbade the
sale of morphine without an express written order.4°4 Blockburger was
ultimately convicted on three of these counts, relating to the second
and third drug sales.405 With respect to the second drug sale, he was
convicted of selling morphine not in the original stamped package. 406
With respect to the third drug sale, he was convicted of selling
morphine not in the original stamped package, and not pursuant to an
express written order. 407 The judge imposed the maximum sentence
on each count,408 ordering that Blockburger serve three consecutive
five-year sentences and pay three fines of $2,000 each.409
Blockburger appealed his sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court.41 0 He raised two
double jeopardy arguments in his Supreme Court petition. First, he
argued that his three drug transactions with the informant constituted
a single offense that could only be punished once. Second, he argued
that the third drug transaction could not be punished twice, even
though it was covered by two different statutes with slightly different
elements.411
401 See id.
402 See id.
403 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 300-01 (1932).
404 See id.
405 See id. at 301.
406 Id.
407 See id.
408 The penalty provision of the Harrison Narcotics Act provided, as quoted by the
appellate court: "Any person who violates or fails to comply with any of the
requirements of sections 211 and 691 to 707 of this title shall, on conviction, be fined
not more than $2,000 or be imprisoned not more than five years, or both, in the
discretion of the court." (Blockburger v. United States, 50 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.
1931) (Alschuler, J., dissenting) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 705)).
409 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
410 See id. at 299-301.
411 See id. at 301.
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The Supreme Court quickly disposed of Blockburger's first
argument. It held that "[tihe Narcotic Act does not create the offense
of engaging in the business of selling the forbidden drugs, but
penalizes any sale made in the absence of either of the qualifying
requirements set forth."412 Thus Blockburger's crime was not
"continuous in its character" like the cohabitation at issue in Snow and
Nielsen.413 Just as the mailbag cutting offense discussed in Ebeling was
completed every time the defendant cut a new bag, Blockburger's
narcotics offense was complete every time he completed a new
transaction. 414
Interestingly, the Blockburger court never analyzed the text of the
Harrison Narcotics Act to determine whether it punished an ongoing
pattern of drug trafficking as a single continuous offense, or punished
each transaction separately. The Court said that the statute penalized
"any sale," but the statute did not actually use this language. One of
the provisions under which Blockburger was prosecuted made it a
crime to "sell, dispense, or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs
[opium and other narcotics] except in the original stamped
package." 415 The other provision made it a crime "to sell, barter,
exchange, or give away any of the drugs specified in section 691 of this
title, except in pursuance of a written order." 41 6 The statute made it a
crime to "sell any drugs," but it did not explicitly authorize a separate
punishment for "any sale," much less "each and every sale." As
discussed above, nineteenth century courts read language like this to
preclude division of a course of conduct into numerous offenses where
such division created a risk of arbitrary and excessive punishment.417
The Blockburger court, like the Ebeling court before it, seemed
unconcerned about this risk.
The Blockburger court's decision to ignore the fact that its ruling
would permit arbitrary and excessive stacking of punishments was all
the more remarkable because the issue was raised by one of the Seventh
Circuit judges who considered Blockburger's case before it went to the
Supreme Court. Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed Blockburger's
sentence, one judge dissented on the ground that the division of
Blockburger's crime into a separate count for each drug transaction
would give prosecutors too much power to dictate Blockburger's
412 Id. at 302.
413 See id.
414 Id. at 303.
415 Id. at 301 n.1.
416 Id. at 301 n.2.
417 See supra Part II.A.4.
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ultimate sentence.418 The dissenting judge noted that the drug
transactions at issue in this case were instigated by the informant, not
Blockburger, and occurred in a more or less continuous series. 419 The
fact that there were several transactions "was a device of the agent, not
of appellant, who would no doubt have been quite as willing to sell the
entire quantity at once."420 It was permissible for the government to use
an informant to purchase drugs from the defendant, "but if ... the
government sees fit to make an installment affair of it, I do not think the
government is in position to say that each installment of such a general
operation constitutes a separate crime." 421
The Supreme Court also rejected Blockburger's second argument,
that the same drug transaction could not be punished twice even
though two separate statutory provisions covered it. The Court
employed what is now known as the "Blockburger test," which holds
that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."422 Because each of
the two provisions under which Blockburger was convicted contained
an element the other did not, it did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause to punish him under both. If the legislature chose to write
numerous penal statutes covering the same criminal conduct, and to
allow that conduct to be punished over and over again, the
Blockburger Court did not wish to stop it.
The "same elements" test did not originate with Blockburger. In fact,
the Blockburger Court cited three cases that had previously applied the
rule.423 But it is worth remembering that the same elements test was
first adopted in an era when there were relatively few criminal
offenses, such offenses usually did not overlap, and when they did
overlap a difference in statutory elements often signaled a significant
difference in statutory object. By the time Blockburger was decided,
our current era of statutory proliferation of crimes was already
underway. In this new era, multiple statutes often cover the same
conduct and often for essentially the same reason - a fact that makes
418 See Blockburger v. United States, 50 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 1931) (Alschuler,
J., dissenting).
419 Id.
420 Id.
421 Id. This analysis also fits well into modern discussions of "sentencing
entrapment." See sources cited supra note 114 and accompanying text.
422 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
423 See id.
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the "same elements" test an inadequate method of accomplishing the
Double Jeopardy Clause's purpose of preventing overpunishment. Just
as the government can impose arbitrary and excessive punishments by
dividing a single course of conduct into numerous smaller offenses, it
can achieve the same effect by punishing a single course of conduct
over and over under different overlapping statutory provisions.424 This
danger was not a matter of concern for the Blockburger Court.
4. Instrumentalism and Cruel and Unusual Punishments
The Supreme Court decided one case in the first half of the
twentieth century in which the defendant claimed that the division of
his crime imposed a cruel and unusual punishment. Badders v. United
States425 involved a defendant who used the mail to further a
fraudulent scheme. Badders was prosecuted under the federal mail
fraud statute, which provided:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud ... shall, for the purpose of executing such
scheme. . . place ... any letter ... in any post-office ... to be
sent or delivered by the post-office establishment of the United
States ... shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars,
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.426
Although Badders apparently engaged in a single fraud scheme, he
was convicted of seven violations of the mail fraud statute on the
ground that he sent seven letters in furtherance of this scheme.427 The
judge gave Badders the maximum sentence of five years imprisonment
424 An additional source of potentially arbitrary and excessive punishment is the
near-total overlap of state and federal criminal law. The Supreme Court has held that
it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause for a state government and the federal
government to try and punish a defendant twice for the same offense because they are
semi-independent sovereigns. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959); see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138-39
(1959). The idea that federal and state law enforcement are "independent" of each
other appears increasingly unrealistic in light of the extensive cooperation and
coordination currently undertaken by federal and state law enforcement, exemplified
by increasingly prevalent federal-state task forces. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale,
Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal
Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1275 (2000) (discussing cooperation and
coordination between state and federal law enforcement).
425 Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
426 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130, 1130.
427 Badders, 240 U.S. at 393.
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and a one thousand dollar fine for each count of conviction. 428 The
judge ordered that the sentences of imprisonment be served
concurrently, so that Badders's total sentence was five years
imprisonment and a $7,000 fine.429
Badders appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court, arguing that
the district court imposed a cruel and unusual punishment and an
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument. 430 Citing Ebeling, it held that "there is no
doubt that the law may make each putting of a letter into the post
office a separate offense. And there is no ground for declaring the
punishment unconstitutional. " 431 The Court provided no analysis
beyond this, and so it is difficult to determine how it reasoned its way
to this conclusion. It may have been significant that Badders' prison
terms were concurrent, so that the only aspect of his punishment that
appeared excessive was his $7,000 fine - but the Court never actually
said this. Thus Badders opened the door to the idea that it was not
cruel and unusual to punish an offender over and over again for the
same course of conduct, so long as such repeated punishment
appeared authorized by the text of the statute. This holding stood in
stark contrast to Justice Field's statement in O'Neil v. Vermont that
although the government could forbid the drinking of a glass of liquor,
it would be an "unheard-of cruelty" to divide the glass into a thousand
drops and punish the drinking of each drop separately.432 Letters sent
in furtherance of a fraud scheme are, in some ways, like those drops of
liquor. A defendant might send one, or seven, or a hundred letters to a
single victim in furtherance of a relatively small fraud scheme. Under
the reasoning of Badders, the government is permitted to seek an
additional five-year sentence for each letter. Perhaps the Badders court
did not consider the possibility that the government would seek to
stack up punishments in this way, although its citation of Eberling
indicates that it must have been aware of the possibility. In any event,
the permissive language of Badders is a forerunner of the Supreme
Court's current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which holds that
there are virtually no limits to the prison sentence that may be
imposed upon an adult offender.433
428 See id.
429 See id.
430 Id. at 393-94.
431 Id. (citing Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915)).
432 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field,J., dissenting).
433 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27-28 (2003) (plurality opinion);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003-04 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
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5. Concerning Instrumentalism and Overpunishment
The instrumentalist revolution attacked the idea that legislative
power should be constrained by morality or tradition. According to the
instrumentalists, the law held no inherent preferences or purposes, no
"delight" in life and liberty. The only relevant preferences and purposes
were those displayed in the statutes enacted by the legislature.
Therefore, it was not the job of judges to restrain legislators from
expanding the scope or severity of criminal law beyond common law
limits. Rather, judges should cooperate with governmental efforts to
use the criminal law as a tool of social control, even where the
government's plan would result in much harsher treatment than
longstanding prior practice would permit. Cases decided during the
first half of the twentieth century, from Eberling, to Blockburger, to
Badders, showed a remarkable lack of concern about the fact that the
government was employing novel units of prosecution enabling it to
obtain multiple convictions for a single course of conduct and impose
cumulative punishments that were arbitrary and excessive in light of
prior practice. That lack of concern survives to this day.
B. Where Do We Go from Here?
We live in a world of excessive punishments. The Weldon Angelos
case was a troubling example of one of the ways in which prosecutors
can impose excessive punishments on defendants whom they disfavor
- but it was far from the only example. The number of incarcerated
people in the United States has grown from around 300,000 in 1970 to
2.25 million today.434 Nearly 160,000 prisoners are currently serving
life sentences,435 many of which are for nonviolent offenses. 436 Over
500,000 prisoners are serving sentences of twenty years or more. 437
and concurring in the judgment).
434 See Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences,
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 151, 163 (2014) (citing LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2011
(2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusll.pdf).
435 Id. at 164 (citing ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE
HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 2, 5 (2013), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incLife%20Goes%200n%202013.pdf ).
436 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR
NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 2, 22 (Nov. 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
111813-lwop-complete-report.pdf (finding 3,278 prisoners serving life imprisonment
for drug, property or other nonviolent crimes in the United States as of 2012).
437 See Berman, supra note 434, at 164 (citing MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, THE MEANING OF "LIFE": LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 11 (2004)).
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Hundreds of thousands of these sentences are so long that the offender
is very likely to die in prison.438 The instrumentalist dream of using
criminal law as an instrument of social control has been fulfilled with
a vengeance. 439
Starting in the 1950s, the Supreme Court made sporadic efforts to
step back from the brink by imposing moral limitations on the
government's power to punish.440  These efforts have generally
foundered because the Court could not find a judicially administrable
standard for imposing such limits. 441 The Court announced in 1958
that the state's power to punish was limited by "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 442 The Court
held in 1983 that it was cruel and unusual to impose a life sentence on
a recidivist convicted of passing a $100 no-account check.443 Just a few
years later, however, the Court reversed course and held that
questions about the justification and duration of imprisonment of
adult offenders are almost completely a matter of legislative
prerogative. 444 In 1990, the Supreme Court replaced the Blockburger
438 See id.
439 This is not to say that all (or even most) instrumentalists approve our current
state of mass incarceration. But as the preceding discussion shows, instrumentalism
has been (for lack of a better word) instrumental in removing traditional moral
limitations on government's power to punish. See generally Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 17-18, 25 (2003) (upholding sentence of twenty-five years to life for recidivist
convicted of shoplifting under California's three strikes law, on the ground that the
legislature could rationally conclude that the sentence furthered goals of deterrence
and incapacitation).
4- Many of these efforts focused on reviving the culpability principle in the wake
of the Supreme Court's previous endorsement of strict liability offenses. See John F.
Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 658,
687 (2012) [hereinafter Punishment Without Culpability]; see, e.g., Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding it unconstitutional to punish individual for
status of being addicted to narcotics); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)
(reading statute to impose mens rea requirement where strict liability reading of
statute would threaten First Amendment values); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957) (holding it unconstitutional to punish defendant for omission she neither
knew nor had reason to know was illegal); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952) (interpreting federal criminal statute as containing mens rea requirement).
441 See Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, supra note 440, at 694-97; see,
e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 514, 534-37 (1968) (refusing to extend Robinson v.
California to prohibit criminal punishment of chronic alcoholic convicted of public
intoxication).
442 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
443 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 303 (1983).
444 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-04 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (plurality opinion) (citing Solem,
463 U.S. at 296-97) (upholding conviction of life imprisonment without parole for
[Vol. 48:19552026
Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments
"same elements" test for double jeopardy with an "essential elements"
test designed to reduce the likelihood that the government would
repeatedly seek to punish the same course of conduct under multiple
overlapping criminal statutes. 445 It abandoned this test a mere three
years later, partly on the ground that it was not judicially
administrable. 446 The Court's use of the rule of lenity as a serious
limitation on the imposition of multiple punishments for the same
offense was also very short-lived. 447
We cannot turn back the clock and ask courts simply to adopt a
nineteenth century worldview. The idea that there is such a thing as
natural law, and that such law should inform the meaning and
application of positive law, no longer enjoys anything like universal
consensus. Moreover, any effort to bring substance back to the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
the rule of strict construction of penal statutes must, if it is to be
successful, provide judicially administrable standards for adjudicating
claims. These are difficult problems, but we have sufficient resources
in the Constitution itself to start moving things in the right direction.
First, as argued in Part II.A above (and more extensively
elsewhere) 448 we can recover a robust and judicially enforceable
definition of "excessive punishments." Under the original meaning of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a punishment is excessive
if it is significantly harsher than the punishments previously imposed
possessing 672 grams of cocaine, distinguishing Solem's facts as in a "different
category" from "any standpoint")
445 See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), overruled by United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
446 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 709, 711 (1993) ("Grady was not only
wrong in principle; it has already proved unstable in application.").
447 Compare Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955) (interpreting the
Mann Act to permit only one punishment for a defendant who transported two
women across state lines in a single trip and stating that "if Congress does not fix the
punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved
against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses..."), with Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 391 (1958) (interpreting three overlapping provisions of federal
narcotics law to permit multiple punishments for a single transaction based on the
Court's belief that these provision had the purpose "of dealing more and more strictly
with, and seeking to throttle more and more by different legal devices, the traffic in
narcotics"). The Gore Court distinguished Bell because Bell discussed a single
provision, not three provisions as in Gore. Id. Chief Justice Warren dissented in Gore,
arguing that "the present purpose of these statutes is to make sure that a prosecutor
has three avenues by which to prosecute one who traffics in narcotics, and not to
authorize three cumulative punishments for the defendant who consummates a single
sale." Id. at 394 (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
448 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 961-78.
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over a long period of time for the same or similar offenses. This
standard is based upon the common law ideology that predominated
at the time the Constitution was adopted and throughout the
nineteenth century. That ideology considered "long usage" the best
standard for determining the goodness of a governmental practice.
Long usage showed that the practice enjoyed the consent of the people
over a period of multiple generations, that it fit the needs of society,
and that it was consistent with basic principles of justice. A new
practice that undermined rights established through long usage, on
the other hand, was presumptively unjust.
The "long usage" conception may also permit development of a
more protective approach to the Double Jeopardy Clause.449 As
discussed above, the Supreme Court currently holds that the Double
Jeopardy Clause permits legislatures to create multiple offenses that
cover the same conduct and to authorize multiple punishments for the
same offense.450 The Clause would be far more protective if courts
continued to ask, as they did prior to the twentieth century, the
following questions: (1) Does the government's proposed mode of
prosecution give it the power to bring multiple charges based on a
single course of conduct?; (2) If so, would such charges permit the
imposition of a cumulative punishment that is arbitrary and excessive
in relation to the offender's culpability, measured in light of prior
punishment practice?451 This analysis would apply whether the
449 The approach gestured at here is far from a full-fledged theory of Double
Jeopardy. A full articulation of such a theory would need to grapple with numerous
complicated problems - for example, the relation of double jeopardy to compound-
complex statutes that include predicate offenses as elements, as well as the parallel
existence of criminal and civil sanctions covering many areas of crime. See, e.g., King,
supra note 100, at 103 (discussing problems posed by the "remarkable increase ... in
the imposition of overlapping civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions for the
same misconduct"); Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions
and Compound Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 334-40 (1998)
(proposing a test for determining when prosecutions for violation of both compound-
complex statutes and the predicate offenses upon which such violations are based
violates the prohibition of double jeopardy). Such articulation is far beyond the scope
of the present article.
450 See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) ("[Wie have utilized
[statutory construction] only to limit a federal court's power to impose convictions
and punishments when the will of Congress is not clear." (emphasis added)); Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.8 (1977) (recognizing that Ohio's dual prosecution on a
single provision would not have violated double jeopardy if Ohio segmented the
provision temporally (i.e., daily) or if Ohio's courts gave the statute a temporal
interpretation (conditioned on due process requirements)).
451 One concern that arises from any effort to use prior practice as a measure of the
goodness of current punishment practice is that much of what we do today is different
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government was proposing a novel unit of prosecution for an offense,
or was seeking to punish a single course of conduct under multiple
criminal statutes. 452
Finally, courts can and should transform the weak and theoretically
bankrupt rule of lenity back into the strong, normatively robust rule of
strict construction of penal statutes. The rule of strict construction of
penal statutes is based upon the premise that the law "delights" in life
and liberty, and that it is the duty of the judiciary to narrowly construe
penal statutes that expand the scope or severity of the criminal law.
The basis for this rule in the modern American legal system is not the
natural law as revealed through the common law, but the preference
for life and liberty reflected in Declaration of Independence, 453 the
from what was done at common law. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 44, at 1005 ("History
will not assist us [in determining the correct amount of punishment for a given course
of conduct], as penalties for common law crimes have changed over time, and most of
today's crime did not exist at common law.").
This obstacle is not as daunting as it first appears, however, for two reasons. First,
prior practice does not mean "what we used to do" but "what we have done up until
now." Phrased differently, the standard I propose has the capacity to adapt to changes
in the culture, and blocks only abrupt and significant deviations from prior practice.
See, e.g., Stinneford, Death, supra note 174, at 590 ("Tlhe Court must compare [new
punishments] with the punishment practices that have prevailed until now. If it is
significantly harsher than those practices, it is cruel and unusual."); Stinneford,
Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 11, at 899 ("[Piroportionality should be
measured primarily in relation to prior punishment practice.").
Second, many "new" crimes are sufficiently analogous to traditional common law
crimes that the punishment imposed can fruitfully compared to prior practice. Bribery
is bribery, whether it is punished under the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341), the
Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), the federal bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 201), or the
federal program bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 666). Although there are sometimes
differences between overlapping statutory offenses that are significant enough to
justify some difference in degree of punishment, the core similarities should be
sufficient to allow a court to determine whether treating them as separate offenses
subject to multiple punishments would permit arbitrariness and excess.
452 Michael L. Seigel and Christopher Slobogin have proposed that judges use their
common law power to create a "law of counts" that would operate in a similar manner
to the standard I am proposing, although it would not be based directly on the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The "law of counts" would authorize courts to "conduct a pre-trial
review of an indictment to determine if the charges in it were duplicative" and
"merge" all counts that "deal with the same conduct or transaction." Michael L. Seigel
& Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need
for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1107, 1128-29 (2005).
453 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.").
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clauses,454 and the
numerous protections the Constitution provides criminal
defendants. 455 A court may appropriately conclude that the legislature
would not wish to enact a statute that authorized arbitrary and
excessive punishments, and may use this principle in determining
whether a penal statute contains an ambiguity to which the rule of
strict construction of penal statutes may fruitfully be applied.
Recovery of the original meaning and purpose of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the
rule of strict construction of penal statutes would provide Weldon
Angelos three plausible bases for invalidating his punishment.
First, Angelos's fifty-five year sentence for gun possession was
almost certainly excessive under the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. A punishment is cruel and unusual if it
is significantly harsher than longstanding punishment practice would
permit for the same or similar crimes. As the district court noted at
454 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("IN~or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....").
455 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder [or] ex post facto Law ...."); U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held
in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress
may by Law have directed."); U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3, cl. 1 ("No Person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court."); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. .."); U.S. CONST.
amend. V1 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."); see also John F. Manning, Lessons from a
Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1541-42 (2008) (arguing that
courts can use canons of statutory construction to address situations in which "official
action does not squarely offend an express constitutional guarantee" but still
"intrude [s] upon widely shared background constitutional values").
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sentencing, Angelos' punishment was harsher than punishments for
more serious crimes in the federal system and for the same crime in
every state system.456 There is no evidence that gun possession -
whether in relation to a drug crime or not - has ever previously been
punished as harshly as § 924(c) authorizes. Section 924(c) itself
originally called for a punishment of one to ten years for a first
offense, and five to twenty-five years for a second or subsequent
conviction. 457 It did not require that these punishments be served
consecutively to any other punishment.458 The current penalty
provisions of § 924(c) are, on their face, five times as harsh as the
original provisions.459 Because these provisions require that each
sentence imposed under § 924(c) be served consecutively to any other
punishment, 460 the actual sentence imposed under them will often be
far more than five times as harsh as they originally would have
been. 461 This exponential increase in punishment severity is part of the
criminal justice system's general march toward ever-greater harshness
over the past forty years,462 and is part of the reason hundreds of
thousands of offenders are currently serving effective life sentences in
prison. The punishments authorized under § 924(c), like many of the
new punishments authorized over the last forty years, are
unprecedented in their harshness and are therefore cruel and unusual.
Second, Angelos could make a strong argument that his sentence
ran contrary to the original meaning and purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause because he was subjected to multiple punishments for
a single gun possession. Angelos's argument would be similar to the
argument Blockburger raised unsuccessfully back in the 1930s.463 The
unit of prosecution under § 924(c) should be the firearm possession
rather than the individual drug transaction because this is the only
reading that prevents the government from imposing punishments
that are arbitrary and excessive in relation to the offender's culpability.
456 See United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1258-59 (D. Utah 2004).
457 See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224.
458 Id.
459 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(C)(i) (2012).
460 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
461 For example, if Weldon Angelos had been convicted of three violations of the
original version of § 924(c), his mandatory minimum sentence would have been five
years imprisonment. Today his mandatory minimum sentence is fifty-five years, an
eleven-fold increase.
462 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in
the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 414-18 (describing the increasing harshness
of criminal punishment during the final decades of the twentieth century).
463 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 299-301 (1932).
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Because the government often has the power to determine how many
"controlled buys" an informant or undercover agent will make from
the offender, a unit of prosecution based on the individual drug
transaction would enable prosecutors to decide for themselves
whether a small-time offender like Angelos will serve five, or fifty-five,
or five hundred and fifty-five years in prison.
In fact, Angelos could argue that Blockburger itself was wrongly
decided, and that the narcotics trafficking statute under which
Angelos was also prosecuted, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), should be
interpreted as creating a continuing offense. § 841(a)(1) makes it a
crime for anyone "knowingly or intentionally.., to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 464 This language does
not clearly indicate that each sale of narcotics should be considered a
separate offense. It does not, for example, say that the offender should
be punished for "each and every act of distribution." Moreover, at least
some of the conduct listed in the statute - particularly manufacturing
- seems to imply some sort of duration. Given this ambiguity about
the intended unit of prosecution, Angelos could argue that § 841(a)(1)
creates a continuing offense, and that punishing him several times
under this statute violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Because penalties under § 841(a)(1) are driven by drug weight
rather than the number of transactions, interpreting this statute as a
continuous offense would not dramatically change the punishments
available for narcotics trafficking. What such a reading would do,
however, is moderate the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) even if the court
finds that the unit of prosecution under § 924(c) should be the drug
offense rather than the gun possession. Under such a reading of §
841(a)(1), the defendant would get an extra five years in prison the
first time he was convicted of using, carrying or possessing a firearm
in relation to his ongoing narcotics offense. If he persisted in using
guns to further his narcotics trafficking efforts after the first
conviction, he would get an extra twenty-five years in prison. In short,
interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) as a continuing offense would
transform 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) into a much more traditional recidivism
statute that creates far less risk of arbitrary and excessive punishments.
The government would still have some ability to increase the
defendant's punishment by obtaining a larger quantity of drugs
through controlled buys, but it would not be able to obtain automatic
twenty-five year escalations for every single controlled buy.
464 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
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Finally, application of the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes would likely have a dramatic effect upon Angelos's potential
sentence irrespective of the division and stacking issue. Recall that in
Deal v. United States,465 the Supreme Court interpreted § 924(c) to
require the escalation of mandatory minimum sentence from five to
twenty-five years for a second count of conviction, even where the
second count is brought in the same case as the first. Similarly, in
Smith v. United States,466 the Court interpreted the word "use" in
§ 924(c) to cover efforts to sell one's firearm in exchange for drugs. In
both cases, the Supreme Court adopted a broad reading of the
statutory provision despite an apparent textual ambiguity, because the
Court did not think the legislature had expressed the intent that the
provision be interpreted narrowly. If the Supreme Court started with
the premise that the law delights in liberty and finds confinement
odious, it could appropriately presume that the legislature would not
want § 924(c) to be interpreted to authorize arbitrary and excessive
punishments. Since excessiveness is measured in relation to prior
practice, one of the main questions would be whether a given reading
of the statute would cause it to depart from prior punishment practice
in the direction of greater harshness.
The Supreme Court's readings of § 924(c) in Deal and Smith both
caused § 924(c) to diverge from prior punishment practice in the
direction of arbitrariness and excess. Deal made § 924(c) depart from
prior recidivism statutes by requiring an escalation of punishment
without showing that the offender continued his illegal conduct after a
prior conviction. Smith made § 924(c) diverge from prior statutes
punishing gun use by allowing a conviction even where the gun is not
used as a weapon, but as barter. Under the rule of strict construction
of penal statutes, both cases were decided incorrectly. Overturning
Smith would not directly benefit Angelos because he was convicted
under the "possession" prong of § 924(c), not the "use" prong.
Overturning Deal, on the other hand, would reduce Angelos's sentence
under § 924(c) from fifty-five years to fifteen years. Angelos would
still spend an awfully long time in prison, but he would at least have
the chance to know his children and grandchildren at some point.
CONCLUSION
The power to divide the unit of prosecution entails the power to
impose excessive punishments. Where the government arbitrarily
465 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
466 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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carves up a single course of conduct into multiple offenses in order to
obtain multiple punishments, criminal offenders are often punished
well beyond their desert. The Supreme Court's current approach to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause,
and the rule of lenity is inadequate to deal with this problem because
the Court focuses on deference to the legislature rather than the
prevention of excessive punishments. This problem can be solved if
the Court returns to the original meaning and purpose of these
doctrines. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits
punishments that are excessive in light of prior practice. The Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense,
even where those prosecutions occur as part of the same case, as a
means of reducing the risk of excessive punishment. The rule of strict
construction of penal statutes reflects the fact that the law loves life
and liberty, and finds arbitrary and excessive punishment odious.
Courts may appropriately read criminal statutes narrowly based on the
presumption that lawmakers would not intend to enact a statute that
authorizes arbitrary and excessive punishment.
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